

Opposition to ethnic territorial autonomy in the Indian parliament

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Abstract

Macro studies of ethnic violence and autonomy assume central governments resist subnational ethnic autonomy on nationalist and economic grounds. I examine these microfoundational claims with original data on Indian parliamentary debates on federal reorganization in the 1950s. I obtain legislators' stances on dozens of proposals for ethnic autonomy and evaluate features of legislators and of autonomy demands as explanations for opposition to ethnic autonomy. Contrary to theory, opposition was not trained on autonomy demands from revenue and resource rich areas. Central religious and linguistic nationalism played ambiguous roles. Above all, regional ethnic rivalries drove opposition to autonomy. The findings suggest new mechanisms and hypotheses to inform the comparative study of ethnoterritorial politics.

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Macro studies of ethnic violence and autonomy assume central governments resist subnational ethnic autonomy on nationalist and economic grounds. I examine these microfoundational claims with original data on Indian parliamentary debates on federal reorganization in the 1950s. I obtain legislators' stances on dozens of proposals for ethnic autonomy and evaluate features of legislators and of autonomy demands as explanations for opposition to ethnic autonomy. Contrary to theory, opposition was not trained on autonomy demands from revenue and resource rich areas. Central religious and linguistic nationalism played ambiguous roles. Above all, regional ethnic rivalries drove opposition to autonomy. The findings suggest new mechanisms and hypotheses to inform the comparative study of ethnoterritorial politics.

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Most ethnic conflict concerns territory. Of the 293 mobilized ethnic groups tracked by Minorities at Risk, 56% define themselves in terms of a territory where they ask for greater self-rule—they seek sovereignty, merger with a neighboring state, autonomy in a subnational jurisdiction, or special rights within their region.¹ Territorial autonomy is the issue at stake in most ethnic civil wars and in the most protracted and deadly civil wars.² Where ethnic groups cross international borders, movements for ethnoterritorial self-rule can also spur interstate violence.³

Amidst this turmoil, the number of subnational autonomous ethnic jurisdictions has grown rapidly since the mid-twentieth century.⁴ However, central governments vary in their willingness to grant such autonomy. This variation is not only across countries but across demands from within the same country.⁵ Relatively few countries are entirely organized into autonomous ethnic units.⁶ Instead, central governments give some areas autonomy and rebuff others.

Research on ethnoterritorial autonomy, particularly in developing countries, most often measures aggregate outcomes: where do autonomy movements materialize, use violence, or succeed.⁷ The microfoundations of these patterns—such as when and why central government actors oppose autonomy—are rarely explored directly.⁸ A few studies unpack pro-autonomy movements,⁹ but not the mechanisms behind government responses to those movements.

This article speaks to the microfoundations of ethnoterritorial politics using legislative debates from the reorganization of India into a quasi-linguistic federation in the 1950s. I measure and explain the opposition of Indian members of parliament (MPs) to the dozens of autonomy proposals circulating at the time. Autonomy movements existed in all parts of India in the 1950s. All national legislators responded to autonomy proposals directly relevant to their constituencies and to proposals from farther afield, as well as to demands that varied by economic and ethnic profile. I exploit this rich variation while also focusing on a single country and time period, controlling for factors such as the institutional structure of the central government and state military strength.¹⁰ I also shed light on a particularly important episode of ethnofederal institutional change. In the 1950s, the survival of India as a single country was by no means certain.¹¹ The 1956 reorganization

has been credited with shoring up the country's territorial integrity and commended as a model for other diverse countries.¹²

I use the debates to consider the microlevel implications of three explanations for why central actors oppose autonomy: central ethnic nationalism; opportunities for central economic extraction; and competing ethnic interests in an autonomy movement's region. Existing studies have correlated all of these factors with outcomes such as territorial autonomy and ethnic war. I test the theories' observable implications about government opposition to autonomy. By investigating these microfoundations, I raise questions about the mechanisms behind aggregate patterns in ethnic politics.

I find that opposition to autonomy is persistently shaped by regional ethnic rivalries, a neglected aspect of ethnoterritorial politics. Indian MPs were more likely to oppose a proposal for ethnic autonomy by their constituents' non-coethnic neighbors.

Central nationalism played an ambiguous role in central legislators' opposition to autonomy. MPs were especially opposed to autonomy proposals from non-Hindu areas but not from minority language areas. Surprisingly, the resistance to non-Hindu autonomy is evident among MPs whose own constituencies were not majority Hindu. I argue that central nationalism in India in this period was important but it counterintuitively led MPs to be most hostile to identities that crosscut central nationalism rather than identities that stood outside that nationalism. Finally, there is no evidence that members of parliament were more likely to oppose autonomy for relatively wealthy or relatively resource rich areas. If anything, MPs opposed autonomy for poor areas, which might not be able to cover their own administrative costs. The MPs' focus on financial viability makes sense post hoc but is quite different from the concern for central extraction that dominates economic accounts of ethnoterritorial politics.

Central views of autonomy

This section reviews theories of ethnic territorial violence and autonomy. Central actors' interests and preferences are not the dependent variable in most of this work. Yet, the arguments in this literature have observable implications for central actors' opposition to various autonomy demands.

Central nationalism

Ethnoterritorial conflict is most frequently blamed on ethnically narrow central governments with exclusionary nationalist projects.¹³ In many European cases, strong states and strong civil societies allowed central nationalism to subdue the periphery. In weaker or newer states, minorities in the periphery are comparatively unassimilated. Meanwhile, the central government is beholden to a relatively narrow ethnic clientèle. It is unlikely to share power with excluded groups unless compelled by violence. The observable implication of this line of argument is that central elites who represent a dominant ethnic group resist autonomy for identities that conflict with the nationalist project. Central resistance strengthens as the cultural differences between the dominant group and the group seeking autonomy widen.¹⁴

Economic value of proposed autonomous area

A second account holds that central actors see regional autonomy as a loss of control over material resources.¹⁵ Assuming the central government can extract a surplus from even poor areas of the periphery, resources explain why central governments oppose ethnic autonomy in general. The center is particularly opposed to autonomy for relatively wealthy or resource rich areas, from which more can be extracted.¹⁶

If central resistance to autonomy is primarily motivated by control of economic resources in the periphery, two observable implications follow. Central actors should be most likely to oppose greater autonomy for relatively wealthy regions and those with abundant natural resources.

Regional rivalry

A final perspective on ethnic territorial autonomy stresses that these movements frequently face local opposition from non-coethnic groups.¹⁷ Creation of an autonomous ethnic region threatens to disadvantage local minorities in the struggle for political and economic resources.¹⁸ Ethnically defined jurisdictions may allocate some rights on the basis of ethnic criteria, as opposed to residency requirements.¹⁹ Citizens outside the autonomous area would be comparatively unaffected by these measures. This difference in salience by region implies that elites are most likely to oppose autonomy for populations that share a region but not an ethnic identity with their own supporters.

I have reviewed speculations about why central government actors oppose some autonomy demands and not others drawn from the literature on macro outcomes in ethnoterritorial politics. Below, I operationalize and test these proposed mechanisms using original data from the Indian parliament.

Indian legislators and ethnofederal upheaval

India's constitutional assembly, dominated by the Indian National Congress (INC) party, preserved many of the subnational borders of British India. When the constitution was finalized in 1950, subnational borders gave a few ethnic groups a majority at the state level. Bengalis of West Bengal fit this description. West Bengal was the exception, however. Most states had no majority ethnolinguistic community. By keeping the British-era borders, the Congress leadership, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, had reversed its pre-independence support for language-based federalism. By contrast, many middle-tier Congress members supported reorganization, as did much of the political opposition.²⁰

Rioting in south India forced Nehru to reorganization, which became law in 1956. The 1956 borders drew states with numerically dominant language communities. The proportion of Indians living in a state where one language group was in the majority went from 35% in 1950 to 52% in

1956. India was not constitutionally redefined as an ethnic federation. However, the states' governments, now dominated by ethnic majorities, had control over the language of state government and education, ethnic quotas in hiring and education, and residency restrictions on many public services.²¹

The data for this project come from the midst of that process. In 1955, the Indian Lok Sabha—the directly elected lower house of the national parliament—considered the report of a centrally-appointed States Reorganisation Commission (SRC). The SRC had made a 2 year fact-finding tour, collecting proposals for redrawing India's subnational boundaries. Most of the petitions called for one ethnic group or another to be given a jurisdiction where it would have an overwhelming majority. In its final report, the SRC summarized the proposals it had received and gave a recommendation on each.²² Shortly after the report was made public, the Lok Sabha debated its contents.

The proposals at stake

The Lok Sabha debate was opened with a motion that the SRC's report should be "taken into consideration."²³ This purely advisory motion allowed the debate to range over the whole of the report; details of reorganization would be hammered out later. The Speaker structured discussion following the outline of the SRC's report, with its enumeration of autonomy petitions from across the country. Table 1 gives two examples of petitions received by the SRC. The first is a proposal for the Malayala-majority district of Madras to be transferred from Madras (an existing, Tamil-plurality state) to Travancore-Cochin, a Malayala-majority state. Moving Malabar to Travancore-Cochin would give ethnic self-rule to the Malayalas in Malabar. This petition was commended by the SRC and implemented in 1956. The second example in Table 1 is a petition for the centrally-controlled territory of Tripura to be made into a state with an elected government. Tripura's Bengali majority would gain ethnoterritorial autonomy. This proposal was unsuccessful. Tripura stayed under central rule and did not become a state until 1971.

I counted 72 proposals for ethnic self-rule in the SRC's report, of which 23 (32%) succeeded

Table 1: Examples of proposals for ethnic territorial autonomy described in the 1955 report of India’s State Reorganisation Commission

Proposal	Ethnoterritorial autonomy for	MP’s constituency in proposal region if	MP’s constituency coethnic with proposed autonomous group if
Malabar district of Madras to Travancore-Cochin	Malayalas of Malabar	In Madras or Travancore-Cochin	Malayala-majority constituency
Elected state government in Tripura instead of central rule	Bengalis of Tripura	In Tripura or Assam (SRC recommended merger of Tripura and Assam)	Bengali-majority constituency

in 1956.²⁴ My goal is not to explain the ultimate success or failure of each autonomy proposal but to record central government actors’ reactions to these proposals.

For and against

To gauge MP opposition to autonomy petitions, I use a December 1955 debate in the Lok Sabha, the directly elected house of India’s parliament.²⁵ The debate ran for more than a week and had very broad participation. Members who did not have a chance to speak could include written statements in the official proceedings. In total, 266 legislators gave either a speech or a statement, accounting for almost 60% of the chamber.

I read and coded the content of every speech and statement, noting which autonomy proposals an MP discussed and whether they supported or opposed those proposals. Most MPs referred explicitly to specific proposals in the SRC report and spoke for or against them. A few MPs indicated that they supported the status quo. Others called for all of the proposals in the SRC’s report to be resolved in favor of greater ethnic autonomy.

My analysis is based on debate transcripts, rather than roll call votes, which are rare in the Lok Sabha. The final vote on state reorganization, in fall 1956, was reported in Indian newspapers

but it is not particularly illuminating. The vote at that point was on the entire reorganization bill, encompassing dozens of jurisdictional changes and excluding many more. In comparative politics, legislatures that rarely vote or vote only on omnibus legislation are a common problem.²⁶ In these cases, debate transcripts are the only means to observe legislators' positions on an issue-by-issue basis.

To encode MPs' statements, I constructed a list of MP/proposal pairs or dyads. Each of the 266 MPs who gave a speech or statement is paired with each of the 72 proposals for ethnic territorial self-rule described by the SRC report.²⁷ For each MP/proposal dyad, I coded a dummy variable for whether the MP opposed this petition for ethnic autonomy. The variable is coded as a 1 if the MP spoke or wrote against a proposal for self-rule and a 0 if the MP spoke in favor. If an MP did not mention the issue or mentioned it in a neutral manner, the dependent variable is coded as missing. Summary statistics for all variables are in Table A1 as part of an on-line appendix.²⁸

I treat not taking a stance on a particular autonomy demand as similar to an observation of abstention in roll call data. The best known dataset on the US Congress, DW-Nominate, treats abstentions as missing data.²⁹ Analysis of that data suggests abstention is correlated with indifference and uncontroversial issues.³⁰ MPs who spoke in the Lok Sabha had a (loosely enforced) time limit, making it likely that not speaking on a particular autonomy proposal is an indication of having indifferent views. Although omitting proposals that an MP ignored is an imperfect solution, it is probably preferable to introducing an opaque selection model. My results are also similar if all non-mentions are coded as cases of non-opposition.³¹

Some MPs did not contribute to the Lok Sabha proceedings at all. Typically, debate time in the Lok Sabha is divided among political parties according to their strength in the house. Party leaders choose who will use the party's time. In the case of the reorganization debates, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha began the debate by asking proponents and opponents of particular autonomy demands to submit, as a group, the name of a pleader who would argue their position. Unfortunately, there is no record of what members submitted in response. Qualitatively, the assumption running through

the debates was that MPs who spoke gave opinions that were representative of categories of MPs. For example, the Speaker noted that members from seats reserved for certain tribes would be called on to give the “tribal point of view.”³² In theory, then, recorded statements were representative of MPs from similar constituencies.

Sources of opposition

The literature reviewed above yields three clusters of expectations about the nature of opposition to autonomy demands. The first predicts greater resistance to autonomy demands made by a non-dominant ethnic group and greater opposition among central actors drawn from the country’s dominant ethnic group. In the second account, central government actors are more likely to oppose autonomy proposals for relatively developed areas and for relatively resource rich areas. Third, the logic of regional rivalries suggests central actors are especially likely to oppose autonomy movements that are both from the same region as their supporters and ethnically unaffiliated with those supporters. This section explains how each of these expectations can be tested in the Indian legislative data.

Central nationalism operationalized

India is majority Hindu and plurality Hindi-speaking, at least according to central nationalism circa the 1950s. Most accounts of India’s first national leaders agree that these men viewed autonomy for religious minorities as dangerous.³³ For example, one Congress MP argued against the proposal for Jharkhand state by saying it threatened to become a “Christianistan.”³⁴ Nationalists also aimed to promote linguistic unity. The central government planning a transition to using only Hindi, instead of English and Hindi, as the language of central government business. Central ministries were also developing and promoting Modern Standard Hindi (MSH) throughout the north of the country. MSH was meant to eclipse dozens of existing languages that linguists most often classify into two large categories, Eastern and Western Hindi. Interestingly, these two language families do

not have a common origin.³⁵

The logic of central nationalism suggests especially high opposition to autonomy demands from non-Hindu areas. MPs representing Hindu majority constituencies should be the most likely to oppose religious minority autonomy. The linguistic dimension of central nationalism implies that autonomy demands by non-Hindi speakers would be most-often opposed. MPs representing Hindi-speaking areas would be the most likely to oppose minority linguistic group autonomy.

To check these four conjectures, I coded autonomy demands according to the religion and language of the proposed autonomous population and coded MPs according to the religion and language of their constituency. A variable named *Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal* indicates whether less than 50% of the population in a proposed autonomous area was Hindu.³⁶ For each MP, I code a *Hindu constituency* dummy: a 0/1 indicator for whether 50% or more of the population in an MP's constituency was Hindu. Using language data, I coded similar variables to indicate a *Non-Hindi area autonomy proposal* or an MP representing a *Hindi majority constituency*.³⁷ I included the multiple languages classified by linguists as forms of Eastern Hindi and Western Hindi in my coding of Hindi-majority constituencies and claim areas. All of the Hindi-majority proposal areas in the data were also Hindu-majority, although the reverse does not hold.

Note that in codings of MP affinity for Hindu and Hindi nationalism, I focus on the ethnic composition of the MP's constituency rather than the identity of the MP. In the coding of regional rivalries below, I likewise use MPs' constituents and not the MPs themselves to determine ethnic alignments. Constituency ethnic composition can be more reliably measured than MPs' personal religious or ethnolinguistic identities. The two are also highly correlated due to the role of identity politics in Indian campaigns.³⁸ Studies of the Lok Sabha suggest that the religious and ethnic identities of MPs almost always correspond to the majority group in their constituency.³⁹

Economic factors in India

Extraction-maximizing central actors should oppose autonomy for relatively wealthy regions and for regions with abundant natural resources. These claims can be evaluated here by measuring the economic conditions in proposed autonomous areas. Subnational indicators of domestic production are not available for India in the 1950s. I use literacy rates as a proxy for economic modernization. I code an indicator for a proposal from a relatively *Developed area* of the country. This variable takes the value of one for proposed autonomous territories where the literacy rate is higher than the national literacy rate at the time.⁴⁰ Roughly one-third of the autonomy proposals in the data concerned areas with literacy rates above the national average. I used a dichotomous measure of relative development for ease of interpretation. The results are substantively similar with a continuous measure of literacy in the proposal area relative to India as a whole.⁴¹

A second dummy variable notes a proposal area where oil or mineral resources were being extracted. *Oil or mineral resources in proposal area* is coded as a one if any of the following were being produced in the proposed autonomous territory: oil, copper, coal, zinc, lead, gold, or diamonds.⁴² India has very limited oil and mineral resources and any area where this kind of production was taking place can be considered relatively resource rich.

Regional rivalry in the India context

Finally, the regional interests at stake in autonomy demands may have driven MP opposition. I sort MP/proposal dyads according to regional and ethnic criteria. First, I distinguish dyads in which an autonomy proposal was likely to affect the MP's home region. An autonomy petition is "in-region" relative to a particular MP if that proposal would have changed the borders or government of (i) the state from which the MP had been elected or (ii) a state the MP's constituency was slated to join under one or both of the two omnibus plans for state reorganization circulated in advance of the debate. The plans were the SRC's recommendations and a modified version of those

recommendations produced by the Congress leadership. Legislators were by no means universally supportive of either plan. However, given the Congress parliamentary majority, either plan might plausibly have been enacted and MPs needed to take the implications for their constituency into account.

Consider the first example in Table 1, a proposal to move the Malabar district from Madras state to Travancore-Cochin state. I code an MP/Malabar proposal dyad as “in-region” if the MP was elected from Madras, the state where Malabar was in 1955, or elected from Travancore-Cochin. All other MPs are “out-of-region” with respect to this proposal for Malabar. The second example is the case of Tripura, which was a centrally-governed state under the 1950 constitution and whose Bengali majority sought greater autonomy in the form of an elected state government. The SRC recommended against that idea and instead suggested that Tripura and Assam merge. The Tripura demand for self-rule is “in-region” for MPs elected from Tripura or Assam. For MPs elected from states other than Tripura and Assam, this proposal was outside of their region.

After sorting dyads in terms of shared region, I identify coethnicity. Like the in-region/out-of-region distinction, an MP’s constituency is coethnic with respect to some petitions for self-rule but not others. I determine coethnicity based on language because the autonomy proposals put before the SRC were almost uniformly stated in terms of linguistic identities. An MP represents “coethnic” constituents relative to a proposal to give greater autonomy to the ethnolinguistic group that was also in the majority among the MP’s constituents. An MP represents “non-coethnic” constituents relative to a proposal for giving self-rule to any ethnolinguistic group that was not the majority among the MP’s constituents. Returning to the examples in Table 1, MPs are coded as having coethnic constituents relative to the Malabar proposal only if the MP represented a majority Malayala-speaking electoral district. MPs represented coethnics of the Tripura proposal if their constituents were majority Bengali. MPs from districts where the majority language was anything other than Bengali had non-coethnic constituents relative to the Tripura autonomy proposal. Note that coethnics were not necessarily in the same region. For example, in Tripura’s case, some MPs

with Bengali-majority constituencies were from the out-of-region state of West Bengal.

Sorting MP/proposal dyads by regional and ethnic alignment produces four combinations: (1) a *Constituency in proposal region and coethnic* MP/proposal pairing, (2) *Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic*, (3) out-of-region and coethnic, and (4) out-of-region and non-coethnic. The first category—coethnic and in-region—includes cases in which the MP’s constituents are the main proponents of autonomy. The third category, out-of-region and coethnic, has relatively few cases. In the analysis to come, I combine the third and fourth categories, considering all out-of-region MPs as a group. The resulting variable is labeled *Constituency outside proposal region* in regression tables.⁴³

Regression set-up

The next section is an analysis of the debates data using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of whether an MP opposed a particular proposal for ethnic self-rule.⁴⁴ The unit of analysis is an MP/autonomy proposal dyad and the outcome is opposition by the MP to that autonomy proposal, a 0/1 variable. Despite the binary dependent variable, I use OLS so that I can estimate models that include fixed effects (dummy variables) for each MP and, in some models, for each autonomy demand. Even with a large number of fixed effects, OLS produces unbiased estimates of coefficients on other variables. Non-linear models, such as logistic regression, are biased in such cases.

Fixed effects are useful because the autonomy schemes before parliament and the MPs reacting to those schemes varied on so many dimensions. Using MP fixed effects means that the comparisons in the regressions are based on comparing a particular MP’s stances on different proposals, as opposed to comparing primarily across different MPs.⁴⁵ The MP fixed effects also help side step the problem of some MPs being absent from the sample because they did not contribute to the debate. In the appendix to this paper, I present regressions without MP fixed effects but with MPs’ political party affiliations; the results are similar to those reported here.⁴⁶

Proposal fixed effects take into account the qualitative differences between various autonomy

demands. Consider the examples in Table 1. The Malabar proposal implied moving a district between states. The Tripura proposal would not change jurisdictional boundaries but asked to convert a centrally-ruled area into a state. MPs might have been more opposed to new borders than to new state governments or vice versa. When a model includes proposal dummy variables, the analysis averages out all MPs' reactions to each issue, capturing whatever made some proposals particularly popular or unpopular. The proposal fixed effects are also useful because one cannot observe proposals that were never made because of an expectation of overwhelming opposition. The downside of the proposal fixed effects is that they can only be used with variables that are not constant for a particular proposal, ruling out variables for the economic or cultural characteristics of a proposal area.

In regressions without proposal fixed effects, I include several control variables measured as features of autonomy demands. First, I record whether there had been pro-autonomy violence in support of a proposal.⁴⁷ To account for collective action potential, I measure *Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)*, the total population in the proposal's region (*Ln population of proposed autonomous area*), and the share of the proposed autonomous area's population belonging to the ethnolinguistic group associated with that proposal (*Population share of autonomy-seeking group*). Finally, to capture the political inclusion of the group seeking autonomy, I measure the ruling party vote share in the 1951 Lok Sabha elections in the proposed autonomous area: *Congress vote share in proposal area*.

Central nationalism, economics, or regional factors?

Table 2 reports OLS models of MP opposition to ethnoterritorial autonomy, all of which include MP fixed effects. Model 1 includes proposal characteristics—relative development, natural resources, and religious composition—and characteristics of MP/proposal dyads. In the latter category are the interaction term of MPs representing Hindu constituencies with autonomy proposals involving religious minorities (*Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal*) and the regional ri-

valry variables. Including an interaction term in a model without one of the components of that term—here, the variable for a Hindu constituency—is somewhat counterintuitive. The Hindu constituency variable is being averaged out by the MP fixed effects. Because that variable does not appear separately, the model does not estimate the difference in rates of opposition between MPs representing Hindu and non-Hindu constituencies. Instead, Model 1 estimates whether proposals from religious minorities were opposed more often generally—the coefficient on *Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal*—and whether that opposition was especially strong among MPs representing Hindu constituents—the coefficient on *Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal*.

Model 2 adds proposal fixed effects to the specification in Model 1. Variables for characteristics of proposals drop out of the model, leaving only the MP/proposal dyad characteristics. Model 2 assesses the robustness of the Model 1 results on the MP/proposal dyad variables. Models 3 and 4 repeat the estimations in the first two models but focus on linguistic rather than religious identity.

Central nationalism

I first consider how religious nationalism (Models 1 and 2) and linguistic nationalism (Models 3 and 4) influenced opposition. Model 1 confirms the antipathy of Indian central elites to religious autonomy demands. Non-Hindu area autonomy proposals were more frequently opposed than proposals from Hindu-majority areas. The coefficient on the non-Hindu area variable implies 38% greater levels of opposition to demands from religious minorities.

More surprising, however, is that MPs from non-Hindu areas were as averse to minority religious autonomy as MPs from Hindu areas. In both Models 1 and 2, the interaction term for MPs from Hindu constituencies and non-Hindu area autonomy proposals has an unexpected negative sign and is statistically insignificant. The result implies there was no important difference in opposition to minority autonomy from MPs with Hindu majority constituents compared to MPs from minority constituencies. I will return to this anomaly below.

Model 3 considers the role of the Hindi language. The dummy variable for autonomy proposals

Table 2: OLS regression models of MPs' opposition to ethnic territorial autonomy proposals

	Expectation	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>					
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	+	0.38** (0.12)			
Non-Hindi area autonomy proposal	+			-0.098** (0.036)	
Developed area, i.e. higher literacy than average	+	-0.062** (0.018)		-0.050** (0.019)	
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area	+	-0.14** (0.018)		-0.11** (0.019)	
Pro-autonomy violence		-0.068** (0.022)		0.011 (0.020)	
Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)		-0.044** (0.0082)		-0.040** (0.0089)	
Ln population of proposed autonomous area		-0.025** (0.0082)		-0.041** (0.0083)	
Population share of autonomy-seeking group		-0.20** (0.032)		-0.17** (0.032)	
Congress vote share in proposal area		-0.25** (0.059)		-0.25** (0.060)	
<i>MP/proposal dyad characteristics:</i>					
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	+	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.19 (0.11)		
Hindi constituency * Non-Hindi proposal	+			-0.11 (0.076)	-0.13* (0.066)
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic	+	0.27** (0.028)	0.25** (0.025)	0.27** (0.028)	0.25** (0.025)
Constituency outside proposal region	+	0.11** (0.028)	0.11** (0.025)	0.12** (0.028)	0.11** (0.025)
Proposal fixed effects		No	Yes	No	Yes
MP fixed effects		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations		2458	2458	2458	2458
Adjusted R-squared		0.47	0.59	0.46	0.59
Additional hypothesis tests:†					
<i>Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic = Constituency outside proposal region</i>					
		45**	44**	43**	43**

†F statistics and significance of two-tailed tests with a null hypothesis of equal coefficients.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

from non-Hindi areas has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, contrary to the intuition that MPs would be more likely to reject proposals from linguistic minorities. Instead, non-Hindi area autonomy proposals faced 10% *lower* rates of opposition. Even among MPs who represented the dominant, Hindi language community, opposition to minority linguistic demands was lower than opposition to Hindi area demands. The interaction term of non-Hindi proposals and Hindi majority constituencies is negatively signed in both Models 3 and 4. If anything, MPs representing Hindi majority constituencies were less likely than other MPs to oppose autonomy for linguistic minorities.

In sum, minority religious areas' autonomy demands were especially likely to meet opposition. Contrary to the expectations of the standard nationalism literature, that opposition was not especially driven by MPs representing Hindu constituencies. The Hindi language results are even more at odds with the supposition that central nationalism explains opposition to autonomy. If anything, autonomy for linguistic minorities was less likely to be opposed, on average. In the discussion below, I suggest modifications to the logic of nationalism that help to explain the statistical results.⁴⁸

Relative development and resources

Even more than the nationalism measures, the economic variables in Table 2 do not play the role predicted for them by general theories of ethnoterritorial politics. Contrary to predictions in the crossnational literature, MPs were, if anything, less likely to oppose autonomy for relatively developed regions and regions producing oil or minerals. Relative development is associated with 5-6% lower opposition to autonomy across the models. The resource dummy is predicts 11-14% less opposition. These negative coefficients are at odds with the expectations of most theories of ethnoterritorial politics. I offer some speculations regarding what those theories miss about economics and ethnic autonomy below.

In the appendix to this paper, I estimate a variety of alternative models to look for evidence

of a positive correlation between relative wealth and central elites' opposition to autonomy. I use urbanization and agricultural employment to code relative development.⁴⁹ I also look for an interaction between development in a proposed autonomous area and the economic status of an MP's constituency.⁵⁰ These robustness checks do not overturn the conclusion that MPs were most opposed to autonomy for less developed areas.

Regional rivalries

Finally, the regional rivalry variables are two dummies characterizing MP/proposal dyads in terms of shared region and ethnic alignment. The omitted category is in-region, coethnic MP/proposal dyads—i.e., dyads in which the MP's constituency was in the proposal region and the majority language group in the MP's constituency was also the ethnic group for which autonomy is proposed. The rate of MP opposition in these omitted dyads is lower than in either included category, which is intuitive. The included in-region, non-coethnic and out-of-region variables have positive and statistically significant coefficients, regardless of whether proposal fixed effects are included or which other variables are used.

The most important comparison, however, is between the two included variables: one for MPs representing in-region, non-coethnic constituencies and the other for out-of-region MPs. The regional rivalry logic suggests higher rates of opposition in the former category. In all four models, an MP was at least twice as likely to oppose autonomy for in-region, non-coethnic groups as to oppose an out-of-region proposal. *F*-tests at the bottom of Table 2 evaluate the null hypothesis that the coefficients on these two regional rivalry variables are equal. All of the models reject the possibility that out-of-region MPs were as likely to oppose autonomy as MPs representing in-region, non-coethnic constituencies. Thus, MP opposition to autonomy was substantially stronger when the balance of ethnic power in their own region was up for debate than otherwise.

An interaction with pro-autonomy violence?

Perhaps the role of central nationalism or economic development would be clearer if the interplay between these factors and violence were included in the model. When pro-autonomy violence happened, did legislators' reactions vary depending on features of the MP or of the autonomy demand? For example, did it matter for MP reaction to violence whether a region demanding autonomy was majority Hindu or not? In Model 2, violence is associated with decreased opposition to autonomy.⁵¹ If that negative association is attenuated or reversed for some autonomy demands, we might conclude that MPs were particularly opposed to these demands and therefore less conciliatory in the face of violence.

In appendix Table A16, I reestimate the models of opposition after adding interactions of violence with relative development, natural resources, religious identity, and regional rivalries. The only significant interaction is between violence and the variable *Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic*. The models imply that MPs were less opposed to autonomy demands in case of violence *except* if the militant demand came from non-coethnics in the MP's home region. Thus, MPs supported autonomy as a means to end violence in other regions of India but were much less willing to do so when in-region, non-coethnics engaged in pro-autonomy violence. This closer examination of the violence data, like the main results, buoys the regional rivalry explanation for MP opposition to autonomy over the other theories.

Discussion

The last section explored three sets of claims about opposition to ethnic territorial autonomy. Indian central elites' religious and linguistic nationalism has a mixed role in that opposition. The results on economic variables run contrary to the expectations of much of the literature. Regional rivalries are a promising explanation of opposition to ethnic autonomy. What can we learn from these findings that might be applicable to the comparative literature on ethnoterritorial politics?

MPs were most prone to oppose autonomy proposals that both involved their own region and targeted their constituents' non-coethnics for self-rule. A few studies note the role of regional politics in Indian federalism.⁵² In the India literature and the larger body of comparative scholarship, however, regional politics is very much a second order concern, while central nationalism and revenue imperatives are given pride of place. The results here suggest regional rivalries should always be entertained as an explanation in accounting for ethnoterritorial violence and autonomy.

Regional rivalries also help make sense of the anomalous results on the religious nationalism variables. A role for religious nationalism is evident above: MPs were more averse to autonomy for non-Hindu areas compared to Hindu majority areas. However, that opposition was no stronger among MPs representing Hindu constituencies. Examining the data, the lack of a difference between MPs representing Hindu and non-Hindu constituencies reflects controversy over dividing Punjab state. This proposal was the most frequently discussed plan involving a minority religious area. Dividing Punjab into areas historically defined by the languages of Punjabi and Hindi would have also created a Sikh-majority state.⁵³ Sikh political parties endorsed a division, while the Punjab Congress party was split on the issue. A number of representatives of Sikh-majority or plurality constituencies in the region, especially those affiliated with Congress, called for the status quo. Meanwhile, many southern MPs, almost all of whom represented Hindu majority constituencies, endorsed ethnoterritorial autonomy across the board, including the division of Punjab. In the Punjab case, the relationship between the religious composition of MPs' constituencies and their policy stances was confounded by the in-region/out-of-region distinction.

Consider A.K. Gopalan, a Madras MP representing a Hindu constituency far from Punjab, who blamed ongoing violence there on the central government's failure to concede language-based autonomy:

As far as Punjab is concerned, that is another question. The linguistic principle is not applied there and adjustment on the basis of that principle, that is the principle of language, is not applied there and we know what is happening in Punjab.⁵⁴

Bakshi Tek Chand, an MP from a linguistically and religiously mixed Punjab constituency, opposed reorganization and blamed internecine struggles for the rancor:

So far as the communal leaders are concerned, for their own little kudos, with a view to establish their petty influence, in order to have some political recognition and for their own selfish purposes, they are misleading the people. ... [political leaders] for their miserable little advantages, want these two communities to fly at each other's throats, want to tear them asunder in order that their personal status may be established.⁵⁵

Tek Chand, like a number of MPs from religiously mixed constituencies in Punjab, focused on the local, inter-communal political rivalries at stake in the Punjab and opposed autonomy on that basis. Regional rivalries in Punjab make sense of the puzzle of large number of MPs representing religious minority districts who also opposed autonomy for non-Hindus.

The investigation of nationalism above produced a bigger anomaly with respect to linguistic identity. MPs were more likely to endorse non-Hindi language autonomy appeals. MPs representing Hindi-majority constituencies were the most likely to show this preference for minority appeals over Hindi appeals. Linguistic reorganization was most popular in southern India, where the major languages are unrelated to Hindi. For many Hindi belt nationalists, the state reorganization process was a concession to southern public opinion. These MPs had resigned themselves to reorganization in the south but were less tolerant of suggestions that the reorganization infect their own states.⁵⁶ Autonomy demands from ostensibly-Hindi majority areas may have been especially threatening because they divided the population that the government was trying to turn into a Hindi bloc. Evidence of this interpretation comes from the Congress leadership's maneuvers to limit discussion of reorganizing the Hindi belt. In a telling bit of heresthetics, the Speaker slated little time for verbal arguments on proposals for Hindi areas.⁵⁷ Proponents of new Hindi belt states complained that the Speaker and Home Minister preventing consideration of such proposals.⁵⁸

The general point this case raises is a challenge to the assumption that greater ethnic difference implies a greater threat to a nationalist project. Indian central elites opposed autonomy for lan-

guages in the Hindi family because they were most worried about shoring up the dominant bloc. Central elites, particularly in post-colonial countries, are likely to fear fissures within the dominant ethnic community, which is itself a relatively recent political construct. Such fears generate antipathy toward autonomy demands from communities that are very similar to the dominant ethnic group. This logic could explain why measures of ethnic difference do not have a clear correlation with ethnoterritorial conflict in cross-national studies.

Finally, debates on India's federal reorganization also do not square with the assumption that central governments oppose ethnic autonomy because of the imperative for revenue extraction. Contrary to the literature, MPs seemed particularly adverse to autonomy for poorer areas. Turning to the qualitative evidence, many MPs argued that new states needed sufficient revenue to support the machinery of a state government. Central actors were less worried that wealthy autonomous regions would withhold resources from the center than they were that poor autonomous regions would not be able to pay their own way. For example, the SRC devoted a chapter of its report to setting out criteria for the financial viability of new states.⁵⁹ Consider the statement of one of the handful of MPs who wanted to drastically reduce the number of states in India and promote greater centralization. Mohanlal Saksena, a Congress MP from the Hindi belt, was not concerned that concentrating resources in a few states would allow regional governments to starve the center. Instead, he argued that too many autonomous units would lead to a shortfall in development spending:

We must have sufficient money for development expenditure. A lot of money is being spent on Rajpramukhs and Governors [state-level appointed offices] and the maintenance of their staff and other paraphernalia. You are going to have in every State High Courts and a Public Service Commission. You are going to have a separate I.G. [Inspector General] for police and all that.⁶⁰

From this point of view, it is autonomy for poor areas, rather than rich areas, that is particularly problematic.

Central governments other than New Delhi might similarly oppose autonomy in poor regions for fear of insolvent subnational governments. Economic models of the politics of subnational borders should incorporate the competing dilemmas of the potential for rich regions to withhold resources and the problem of poor regions not covering their own overhead costs. Such models would yield new predictions as to when elites prefer autonomy demands from poor regions versus rich regions.

Microfoundations of ethnoterritorial politics

Microlevel features of ethnoterritorial politics, such as elite and nonelite preferences and political behavior, are too often assumed rather than investigated. This paper takes a step toward understanding ethnoterritorial politics as a process, as opposed to examining only the correlates of outcomes such as autonomy and violence. I conduct a quantitative case study of legislative debates prior to the 1956 reorganization of India into a quasi-linguistic federation.

MPs' opposition to ethnoterritorial autonomy is most persistently explained by regional ethnic rivalries, which figure much less prominently in the comparative literature on ethnoterritorial politics than resource conflict and clashing nationalist sentiments. The results here suggest that regional rivalries may need to be given more weight. For example, regional rivalries are needed to understand how religious nationalism influenced Indian MPs. Like other studies of India, I find central elites were especially opposed to autonomy for religious minorities. Surprisingly, this opposition appears at about the same rate among MPs representing Hindu and non-Hindu constituencies. That puzzle is driven by the tangle of regional rivalries at play in the high-profile case of Punjab. The lesson for comparativists is that regional ethnic rivalries should be treated as an important candidate explanation for outcomes in ethnoterritorial politics.

The center's linguistic nation-building project shaped the terms of debate but not by creating a positive relationship between language difference and central opposition to autonomy. Instead, the imperative of building a dominant ethnic bloc prompted MPs from Hindi areas to be particularly

opposed to autonomy demands that exposed faultlines in the Hindi belt. Like regional ethnic rivalries, anxiety over shoring up the dominant ethnic group is plausibly at work in ethnoterritorial politics in many countries.

The biggest challenge this article raises is to economic models of ethnoterritorial politics. Concern over the financial viability of autonomous subunits is a competing consideration with fear of autonomous regions withholding their greater-than-average revenues from the center. A question for future theoretical and empirical work is to specify the conditions under which a central government is most concerned about fiscal problems in poor autonomous areas versus conditions under which the center's fear of rich regions withholding resources is paramount.

Notes

¹Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. *Minorities at Risk Dataset*. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Subnational ethnoterritorial autonomy arrangements vary in the degree of power and types of competencies exercised by regional entities. See Thomas Benedikter. 2007. *The World's Working Regional Autonomies: An Introduction and Comparative Analysis*. London: Anthem Press; Stefan Wolff. 2013. "Conflict Management in Divided Societies: The Many Uses of Territorial Self-Governance". *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 20 (1): 27–50.

²Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2011. "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison". *American Political Science Review* 105 (03): 478–495; Erin Jenne. 2006. "National Self-Determination: A Deadly Mobilizing Device". In *Negotiating Self-Determination*, ed. by Hurst Hannum and Eileen F. Babbitt, 7–36. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books; Barbara Walter. 2009. *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts are so Violent*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

³Stephen M. Saideman. 2012. *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.

⁴Philip G. Roeder. 2007. *Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 48.

⁵Walter.

⁶Liam Anderson. 2014. "Ethnofederalism: The Worst Form of Institutional Arrangement...?" *International Security* 39 (1): 165–204.

⁷Cederman et al.; Jenne; Walter; Dawn Brancati. 2006. "Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?" *International Organization* 60 (3): 651–685; Graham K. Brown. 2009. "Regional Autonomy, Spatial Disparity and Ethnoregional Protest in Contemporary Democracies: A Panel Data Analysis, 1985–2003". *Ethnopolitics* 8 (1): 47–66; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. 2006. "The Political Economy of Secession". In *Negotiating Self-Determination*, ed. by Hurst Hannum and Eileen Babbitt, 37–59. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books; Christa Deiwick, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2012. "Inequality and Conflict in Federations". *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (2): 289–304; Jason Sorens. 2009. "The Partisan Logic of Decentralization in Europe". *Regional & Federal Studies* 19 (2): 255–272; Monica D. Toft. 2005. *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Violence, Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min. 2009. "Ethnic politics and armed conflict: A configurational analysis of a new global dataset". *American Sociological Review* 74 (11): 316–337.

⁸The same criticism can be leveled against recent cross-sectional studies of ethnoterritorial violence in India—e.g., Giovanni Capoccia, Lawrence Sáez, and Eline de Rooij. 2012. “When State Responses Fail: Religion and Secessionism in India, 1952–2002”. *The Journal of Politics* 74 (4): 1010–1022; Bethany Lacina. 2014. “How Governments Shape the Risk of Civil Violence: India’s Federal Reorganization, 1950–56”. *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (3): 720–738.

⁹Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 2014. *Inside the Politics of Self-Determination*. New York: Oxford University Press; Luis de la Calle. 2015. *Nationalist Violence in Postwar Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Paul Staniland. 2014. *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

¹⁰On the other hand, a single country research design cannot test theories about ethnoterritorial politics that focus on country-level characteristics. These include, for example, Walter’s claims about the total number of possible autonomy movements in a country and theories based on the party system—see, e.g., Bonnie M. Meguid. 2009. *Party Competition Between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹¹Selig S. Harrison. 1960. *India: The Most Dangerous Decades*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

¹²Atul Kohli. 1997. “Can democracies accommodate ethnic nationalism? Rise and decline of self-determination movements in India”. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 56 (2): 325–344; Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav. 2011. *Crafting State-Nations: India and Multinational Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Steven Wilkinson. 2008. “Which group identities lead to the most violence? Evidence from India”. In *Order, Conflict, and Violence*, ed. by Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud, 271–300. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹³Kristin M. Bakke. 2015. *Decentralization and Intrastate Struggles: Chechnya, Punjab, and Quebec*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Clifford Geertz, ed. 1963. *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*. New York: The Free Press; Ernest Gellner. 1964. *Thought and Change*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Michael Hechter. 2000. *Containing Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Daniel S. Treisman. 1997. “Russia’s ‘Ethnic Revival’: The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order”. *World Politics* 29 (2): 212–249; Andreas Wimmer. 2012. *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴Joan Esteban, Laura Mayoral, and Debraj Ray. 2012. “Ethnicity and Conflict: Theory and Facts”. *Science* 336 (6083): 858–865.

¹⁵Ernest Gellner. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Peter Alexis Gourevitch.

1979. "The Reemergence of 'Peripheral Nationalisms': Some Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth". *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (3): 303–322; Donald L. Horowitz. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; Stephen Wyn Williams. 1977. "Internal Colonialism, Core-Periphery Contrasts and Devolution: An Integrative Comment". *Area* 9 (4): 272–278.

¹⁶Brown; Deiwiks et al.; Hale; Roeder.

¹⁷See Bakke; Toft; Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham and Nils B. Weidmann. 2010. "Shared Space: Ethnic Groups, State Accommodation, and Localized Conflict". *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (4): 1035–1054; Bethany Lacina. 2015. "Periphery versus periphery: The stakes of separatist war". *Journal of Politics* 77 (3): 692–706.

¹⁸Benedikter, 66–71.

¹⁹Roeder.

²⁰Myron Weiner. 1962. *The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

²¹Paul Brass. 1974. *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Myron Weiner. 1978. *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Steven I. Wilkinson. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

²²States Reorganisation Commission. 1955. *Report of the States Reorganisation Commission*. New Delhi: Government of India Press, ii.

²³Lok Sabha Secretariat, 17.

²⁴My count of 72 proposals does not include proposals in the report that were not plans for ethnic territorial autonomy. For example, a few of the proposals in the report advocated a transfer of territory based on administrative convenience despite the acknowledged lack of an ethnic basis for the change. Also, the SRC's mandate did not extend to Jammu and Kashmir.

²⁵The debate and appended statements are found in: Lok Sabha Secretariat. 1955. *Lok Sabha Debates on the Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, 14th December to 23rd December, 1955*. New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat. Speeches and statements were recorded in Hindi or English. If an MP used another language, the speech or statement was translated to English by the Lok Sabha Secretariat. I excluded speeches by the Prime Minister and Home Minister in their capacity as members of the cabinet and MP interjections about debate procedure.

²⁶Simon Hug. 2010. "Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes". *British Journal of Political Science* 40 (1): 225–235.

²⁷Information on MPs from: Election Commission of India. 2015. *General Election Results and Statistics*. New

Delhi: Government of India.

²⁸URL to be determined.

²⁹Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. "D-Nominate after 10 Years: A Comparative Update to *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting*". *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26 (1): 5–29.

³⁰Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-economic History of Roll Call Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.

³¹Table A10.

³²Lok Sabha Secretariat, 522–524.

³³Brass; Capoccia et al.; Wilkinson 2008.

³⁴Lok Sabha Secretariat, 636.

³⁵Michael C. Shapiro. 2003. "Hindi". In *The Indo-Aryan Languages*, ed. by George Cardona and Dhanesh Jain, 250–285. New York: Routledge; Gurharpal Singh. 2000. *Ethnic Conflict in India*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

³⁶Central Statistical Organisation. 1951. *Census of India 1951*. New Delhi: Government of India Press; Election Commission of India. 1951. *Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 1951*. New Delhi: Government of India.

³⁷Central Statistical Organisation; George Abraham Grierson. 1928. *Linguistic Survey of India*. Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing (India); Office of the Registrar General, Census Commissioner, and Controller of Publications. 2004. *India Administrative Atlas, 1872-2001: A Historical Perspective of Evolution of Districts and States in India*. New Delhi: Government of India.

³⁸Kanchan Chandra. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Head Counts in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

³⁹Rajeev Bhargava. 2007. "On the Persistent Political Under-Representation of Muslims in India". *Law and Ethics of Human Rights* 1 (1): 1–58; Marc Galanter. 1979. "Compensatory Discrimination in Political Representation: A Preliminary Assessment of India's Thirty-Year Experience with Reserved Seats in Legislatures". *Economic and Political Weekly* 14 (7): 437–454.

⁴⁰Central Statistical Organisation.

⁴¹Table A11.

⁴²Elisabeth Gilmore et al. 2005. "Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset". *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22 (3): 257–292; IndiaStat. 2013. *IndiaStat: Revealing India Statistically*. New Delhi: Datanet India; Päivi Lujala, Jan Ketil Rød, and Nadja Thieme. 2007. "Fighting over Oil: Introducing A New Dataset". *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24 (3): 239–256.

⁴³The analysis below is not materially changed if, instead, all coethnic MP/proposal dyads (in-region and out-of-region) are combined into a single category (Table A14).

⁴⁴Cross-tabulations of key independent variables and MP opposition to autonomy are displayed in Tables A3–A5. The models in the main text use these independent variables simultaneously. As a check against collinearity, appendix Table A9 reports models using the nationalism, economic, and regional rivalry variables separately and without control variables. The results are similar to those in the main text.

⁴⁵These within-MP comparisons are necessarily based only on MPs who took a position on at least two autonomy proposals. Sixteen MPs who gave an opinion on only one proposal drop out of the analysis. Even without these observations, at least two MPs weighed in on each of the autonomy proposals, ensuring that the proposal fixed effects do not cause any dropped observations.

⁴⁶Table A15.

⁴⁷I use violence data from the *Times of India* as reported in Lacina, 2014. I reviewed the events in this data to make two modifications. First, I matched violent events with the relevant autonomy proposals in the SRC’s report. Second, I considered only violence by supporters of these proposals. The result is a dummy variable indicating whether there was pre-debate, pro-autonomy violence related to each of the proposals in my dataset. I find such violence related to thirteen of 72 proposals (18%).

⁴⁸In appendix Table A15, I conduct an alternative analysis of nationalism, asking whether MPs in Hindu right parties reacted to minority autonomy demands in a systematically different manner. Hindu right parties were substantially less electorally important in India in the 1950s than they are today and had relatively few representatives in the Lok Sabha. I find that Hindu right MPs were somewhat more likely to oppose non-Hindu areas’ autonomy. This difference is not statistically significant, however, possibly because of limited data. Contrary to the expectations of the nationalism thesis, Hindu right MPs were somewhat less likely than other MPs to oppose non-Hindi area autonomy proposals. Again, this is not a statistically significant difference.

⁴⁹Table A12.

⁵⁰Table A13.

⁵¹That correlation is consistent with the view that ethnoterritorial autonomy is usually a reluctant central concession designed to prevent or end social unrest. See John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary. 2009. “Must Pluri-national Federations Fail?” *Ethnopolitics* 8 (1): 5–25, 6–7.

⁵²Bakke; Lacina, 2014.

⁵³Complicating the situation, Hindus in Sikh majority areas increasingly identified their preferred language as Hindi. See Brass.

⁵⁴Lok Sabha Secretariat, 63–64.

⁵⁵Lok Sabha Secretariat, 274.

⁵⁶Tillin.

⁵⁷Lok Sabha Secretariat, 22–24, 517.

⁵⁸Lok Sabha Secretariat, 648, 1019.

⁵⁹States Reorganisation Commission, chp. IV.

⁶⁰Lok Sabha Secretariat, 811.

Appendix for “Opposition to ethnic territorial autonomy
in the Indian parliament”

Intended for on-line publication through journal website
and/or Dataverse

Table A1: Summary statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent variable (MP/demand dyad characteristic):</i>				
Opposition to proposal	0.50	0.50	0	1
Opposition to proposal with non-mentions coded as zero	0.50	0.50	0	1
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>				
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	0.068	0.25	0	1
Non-Hindi area autonomy proposal	0.91	0.29	0	1
Developed area, i.e. higher literacy than average	0.42	0.49	0	1
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area	0.33	0.47	0	1
Pro-autonomy violence	0.24	0.43	0	1
Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)	6.5	1.1	0	7.7
Ln population of proposed autonomous area	15	1.1	12	17
Population share of autonomy-seeking group	0.53	0.29	0	0.95
Congress vote share in proposal area	0.47	0.14	0.12	1
Literacy rate relative to national rate	1.0	0.54	0.29	2.8
Developed area, i.e. higher urbanization than average	0.52	0.50	0	1
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal * Violence	0.057	0.23	0	1
Developed area * Violence	0.18	0.38	0	1
Oil or mineral resources * Violence	0.038	0.19	0	1
<i>MP/demand dyad characteristics:</i>				
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	0.063	0.24	0	1
Hindi constituency * Non-Hindi proposal	0.087	0.28	0	1
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic	0.25	0.43	0	1
Constituency outside proposal region	0.59	0.49	0	1
Constituency outside proposal region, not coethnic	0.56	0.50	0	1
Hindu right MP * Non-Hindu proposal	0.0016	0.040	0	1
Hindu right MP * Non-Hindi proposal	0.021	0.14	0	1
Developed area proposal * Developed constituency	0.20	0.40	0	1
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area and MP's constituency	0.083	0.28	0	1
In-region, non-coethnic * Violence	0.056	0.23	0	1
Out-of-region * Violence	0.14	0.35	0	1
<i>MP characteristics:</i>				
Hindu majority constituency	0.97	0.16	0	1
Hindi majority constituency	0.10	0.31	0	1
Congress party	0.77	0.42	0	1
Communist party	0.044	0.21	0	1
Hindu right party	0.024	0.15	0	1
Observations	2458			

Table A2: Summary statistics after recoding dependent variable with non-mentions as cases of non-opposition. See Table A10 below.

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Dependent variable (MP/demand dyad characteristic):</i>				
Opposition to proposal with non-mentions coded as zero	0.035	0.18	0	1
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>				
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	0.056	0.23	0	1
Non-Hindi area autonomy proposal	0.94	0.23	0	1
Developed area, i.e. higher literacy than average	0.36	0.48	0	1
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area	0.32	0.47	0	1
Pro-autonomy violence	0.18	0.38	0	1
Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)	6.6	1.1	0	7.7
Ln population of proposed autonomous area	14	1.0	12	17
Population share of autonomy-seeking group	0.39	0.31	0	0.95
Congress vote share in proposal area	0.48	0.16	0.12	1
Literacy rate relative to national rate	0.97	0.51	0.29	2.8
Developed area, i.e. higher urbanization than average	0.36	0.48	0	1
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal * Violence	0.042	0.20	0	1
Developed area * Violence	0.11	0.31	0	1
Oil or mineral resources * Violence	0.042	0.20	0	1
<i>MP/demand dyad characteristics:</i>				
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	0.054	0.23	0	1
Hindi constituency * Non-Hindi proposal	0.10	0.30	0	1
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic	0.10	0.30	0	1
Constituency outside proposal region	0.86	0.35	0	1
Constituency outside proposal region, not coethnic	0.84	0.36	0	1
Hindu right MP * Non-Hindu proposal	0.0010	0.032	0	1
Hindu right MP * Non-Hindi proposal	0.017	0.13	0	1
Developed area proposal * Developed constituency	0.14	0.35	0	1
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area and MP's constituency	0.072	0.26	0	1
In-region, non-coethnic * Violence	0.014	0.12	0	1
Out-of-region * Violence	0.16	0.37	0	1
<i>MP characteristics:</i>				
Hindu majority constituency	0.96	0.19	0	1
Hindi majority constituency	0.11	0.31	0	1
Congress party	0.74	0.44	0	1
Communist party	0.051	0.22	0	1
Hindu right party	0.018	0.13	0	1
Observations	35136			

Description of variables introduced in appendix

- Dependent variables (MP/proposal dyad characteristics)
 - *Opposition to proposal with non-mentions coded as zero*: If an MP did not mention a particular autonomy proposal or mentioned it in a neutral manner, opposition is coded as a zero, rather than as missing.
- Autonomy proposal characteristics
 - *Literacy rate relative to national rate*: Adult literacy rate in area of autonomy proposal divided by national literacy rate. From Central Statistical Organisation. 1951. *Census of India 1951*. New Delhi: Government of India Press.
 - *Developed area, i.e. higher urbanization than average*: A 0/1 variable coded as a 1 for proposal areas with an urbanization rate above the national urbanization rate. From: Central Statistical Organisation. 1951. *Census of India 1951*. New Delhi: Government of India Press.
 - *Developed area, i.e. less agrarian than average*: A 0/1 variable coded as a 1 for proposal areas with a lower proportion of the workforce involved in agriculture than the national average. From: Central Statistical Organisation. 1951. *Census of India 1951*. New Delhi: Government of India Press.
- MP/proposal dyad characteristics
 - *Constituency outside proposal region, not coethnic*: A dummy variable noting cases in which the majority language group in an MP's constituency was not the ethnic group that would receive autonomy under an autonomy proposal and the MP's constituency was not in that proposal's region. When the dummy variables *Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic* and *Constituency outside proposal region, not coethnic* are included in a regression model, the implicit reference category is MP/proposal dyads in which the majority ethnic group in the MP's constituency was the same as the ethnic group associated with the autonomy proposal, although the constituency may or may not have been in the proposal region.
 - *Developed area proposal * Developed constituency*: Dummy variable for a dyad in which both the proposal area and the MP's constituency have literacy rates above the national average.
 - *Oil or mineral resources in proposal area and MP's constituency*: Dummy variable for a dyad in which the proposal area and the MP's constituency are oil or mineral producing areas.
- MP characteristics
 - *Congress party*: A dummy variable for an MP who was elected as a member of the Indian National Congress. When the Congress, communist and Hindu right party variables are included in the same model, the omitted reference category is made up of

members of various socialist parties (the largest opposition bloc) and a few independents. All party variables are from: Election Commission of India. 2015. *General Election Results and Statistics*. New Delhi: Government of India.

- *Communist party*: A dummy variable for an MP who was elected as a member of the Communist Party of India, Forward Bloc (Marxist Group), or People’s Democratic Front.
- *Hindu right party*: A dummy variable for an MP who was elected as a member of the Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, Akhil Bharatiya Ram Rajya Parishad, or All India Bharatiya Jan Sangh.

Table A3: Cross-tabulations of MP opposition to ethnic territorial autonomy proposals, Hindu religious identity, and Hindi linguistic identity

(a) Religious identity

Proposal region majority non-Hindu?	MP's constituency majority Hindu?	N†	% Opposing autonomy proposal	Difference‡
N	<i>all</i>	2290	48	
Y	<i>all</i>	168	74	26**
N	N	51	43	
Y	N	14	57	14
N	Y	2239	49	
Y	Y	154	76	27**

(b) Linguistic identity

Proposal region majority non-Hindi?	MP's constituency majority Hindi?	N†	% Opposing autonomy proposal	Difference‡
N	<i>all</i>	225	72	
Y	<i>all</i>	2233	48	-23**
N	N	184	70	
Y	N	2018	46	-24**
N	Y	41	78	
Y	Y	215	63	-15

† Unit of analysis is the MP/proposal dyad.

‡ Reported with statistical significance of two-tailed test for difference in proportions.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Cross-tabulations of MP opposition to ethnic territorial autonomy proposals, relative development, and natural resources

(a) Relative development

Proposal region relatively developed?	N†	% Opposing autonomy proposal	Difference‡
N	1423	57	
Y	1035	41	-16**

(b) Oil and mineral resources

Proposal region produces oil or mineral resources?	N†	% Opposing autonomy proposal	Difference‡
N	1656	54	
Y	802	43	-11**

† Unit of analysis is the MP/proposal dyad.

‡ Reported with statistical significance of two-tailed test for difference in proportions.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Cross-tabulations of MP opposition to ethnic territorial autonomy proposals and regional rivalry variables

MP's constituency in proposal region?	MP's constituency coethnic with proposed autonomous group?	N†	% Opposing autonomy proposal	Difference cf. in-region, non-coethnic constituency MPs‡
Y	N	605	61	
Y	Y	413	17	-44**
N	<i>all</i>	1440	55	-5.7*
N	N	1387	55	-5.6*
N	Y	53	53	-8.2

† Unit of analysis is the MP/proposal dyad.

‡ Reported with statistical significance of two-tailed test for difference in proportions.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: The interaction of central nationalism and pro-autonomy violence in MPs' opposition to ethnic territorial autonomy

Autonomy proposal for non-Hindu area?	Prior pro-autonomy violence and % opposing autonomy proposal			Difference in differences‡
	No violence	Violence	Difference†	
N	51	37	-15**	
Y	96	70	-26*	-11

† Reported with statistical significance of two-tailed test for difference in proportions.

‡ Statistical significance calculated from two-tailed test after OLS regression.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: The interaction of economic resources and pro-autonomy violence in MPs' opposition to ethnic territorial autonomy

(a) Relative development

Proposal region relatively developed?	Prior pro-autonomy violence and % opposing autonomy proposal			Difference in differences‡
	No violence	Violence	Difference†	
N	57	58	1.2	
Y	42	40	-2.0	-3.2

(b) Oil or mineral resources

Proposal region produces oil or mineral resources?	Prior pro-autonomy violence and % opposing autonomy proposal			Difference in differences‡
	No violence	Violence	Difference†	
N	58	44	-15**	
Y	42	51	8.6	23**

† Reported with statistical significance of two-tailed test for difference in proportions.

‡ Statistical significance calculated from two-tailed test after OLS regression.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: The interaction of regional rivalries and pro-autonomy violence in MPs' opposition to ethnic territorial autonomy

MP's constituency in proposal region?	MP's constituency coethnic with proposed autonomous group?	Prior pro-autonomy violence and % opposing autonomy proposal			Difference in differences cf. in-region, non-coethnic constituency MPs‡
		No violence	Violence	Difference†	
Y	N	59	68	8.9*	
Y	Y	20	8.2	-12**	-21**
N	<i>all</i>	58	47	-11**	-20**

† Reported with statistical significance of two-tailed test for difference in proportions.

‡ Statistical significance calculated from two-tailed test after OLS regression.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: OLS models of MP opposition to ethnoterritorial autonomy estimated without covariates

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>								
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	0.21 (0.13)							
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal			-0.20** (0.032)					
Developed area, i.e. higher literacy than average					-0.091** (0.018)			
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area						-0.13** (0.018)		
<i>MP/proposal dyad characteristics:</i>								
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	-0.0068 (0.13)	-0.049 (0.11)						
Hindi constituency * Non-Hindi proposal			0.012 (0.078)	-0.033 (0.066)				
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic							0.28** (0.029)	0.24** (0.025)
Constituency outside proposal region							0.10** (0.028)	0.10** (0.025)
Proposal fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
MP fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2458	2458	2458	2458	2458	2458	2458	2458
Adjusted R-squared	0.39	0.57	0.40	0.57	0.39	0.40	0.41	0.59
Additional hypothesis tests: †								
<i>Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic = Constituency outside proposal region</i>							52**	44**

†F statistics and significance of two-tailed tests with a null hypothesis of equal coefficients.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: OLS models of MP opposition to ethnoterritorial autonomy with non-mentions coded as zeros

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>				
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	0.062** (0.018)			
Non-Hindi area autonomy proposal			-0.023** (0.0043)	
Developed area, i.e. higher literacy than average	-0.0027 (0.0018)		-0.00021 (0.0018)	
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area	-0.0051** (0.0018)		-0.00074 (0.0018)	
Pro-autonomy violence	0.0033 (0.0024)		0.011** (0.0022)	
Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)	-0.0050** (0.00076)		-0.0037** (0.00079)	
Ln population of proposed autonomous area	0.0047** (0.00087)		0.0021* (0.00086)	
Population share of autonomy-seeking group	0.032** (0.0028)		0.033** (0.0028)	
Congress vote share in proposal area	-0.015** (0.0053)		-0.018** (0.0053)	
<i>MP/proposal dyad characteristics:</i>				
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	-0.037* (0.019)	-0.036 (0.018)		
Hindi constituency * Non-Hindi proposal			-0.064** (0.011)	-0.063** (0.011)
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic	0.044** (0.0048)	0.048** (0.0048)	0.047** (0.0048)	0.051** (0.0048)
Constituency outside proposal region	-0.038** (0.0042)	-0.039** (0.0041)	-0.035** (0.0042)	-0.037** (0.0042)
Proposal fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
MP fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	35136	35136	35136	35136
Adjusted R-squared	0.34	0.36	0.34	0.36
Additional hypothesis tests: †				
<i>Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic = Constituency outside proposal region</i>				
	900**	1000**	900**	1000**

†F statistics and significance of two-tailed tests with a null hypothesis of equal coefficients.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Reestimation of models in main text using a continuous coding of relative development

	Model 17	Model 18
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>		
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	0.38** (0.12)	
Non-Hindi area autonomy proposal		-0.12** (0.036)
Literacy rate relative to national rate	0.0012 (0.017)	-0.0041 (0.018)
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area	-0.13** (0.019)	-0.11** (0.019)
Pro-autonomy violence	-0.086** (0.023)	-0.00042 (0.020)
Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)	-0.050** (0.0081)	-0.042** (0.0089)
Ln population of proposed autonomous area	-0.030** (0.0083)	-0.045** (0.0084)
Population share of autonomy-seeking group	-0.20** (0.032)	-0.17** (0.032)
Congress vote share in proposal area	-0.27** (0.059)	-0.26** (0.060)
<i>MP/proposal dyad characteristics:</i>		
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	-0.13 (0.12)	
Hindi constituency * Non-Hindi proposal		-0.10 (0.076)
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic	0.27** (0.028)	0.27** (0.028)
Constituency outside proposal region	0.10** (0.027)	0.11** (0.028)
Proposal fixed effects	Yes	Yes
MP fixed effects	2458	2458
Observations	0.47	0.46
Additional hypothesis tests:†		
	<i>Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic = Constituency outside proposal region</i>	
	50**	46**

†F statistics and significance of two-tailed tests with a null hypothesis of equal coefficients.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Reestimation of models in main text with coding of relative development based on urbanization and share of workforce involved in agriculture

	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>				
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	0.40** (0.12)		0.37** (0.12)	
Non-Hindi area autonomy proposal		-0.11** (0.035)		-0.12** (0.035)
Developed area, i.e. higher urbanization than average	-0.084** (0.019)	-0.073** (0.019)		
Developed area, i.e. less agrarian than average			0.015 (0.018)	0.040* (0.018)
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area	-0.13** (0.018)	-0.11** (0.018)	-0.13** (0.019)	-0.096** (0.019)
Pro-autonomy violence	-0.059** (0.022)	0.022 (0.020)	-0.087** (0.021)	-0.0070 (0.020)
Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)	-0.056** (0.0081)	-0.049** (0.0091)	-0.049** (0.0080)	-0.040** (0.0089)
Ln population of proposed autonomous area	-0.020* (0.0084)	-0.037** (0.0085)	-0.031** (0.0085)	-0.050** (0.0085)
Population share of autonomy-seeking group	-0.19** (0.032)	-0.16** (0.032)	-0.20** (0.032)	-0.17** (0.032)
Congress vote share in proposal area	-0.17** (0.063)	-0.18** (0.063)	-0.27** (0.059)	-0.27** (0.059)
<i>MP/proposal dyad characteristics:</i>				
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	-0.14 (0.12)		-0.13 (0.12)	
Hindi constituency * Non-Hindi proposal		-0.11 (0.075)		-0.10 (0.076)
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic	0.27** (0.028)	0.27** (0.028)	0.26** (0.028)	0.27** (0.028)
Constituency outside proposal region	0.11** (0.027)	0.12** (0.028)	0.10** (0.028)	0.10** (0.028)
Proposal fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP fixed effects	2458	2458	2458	2458
Observations	0.47	0.46	0.47	0.46
Additional hypothesis tests: †				
	<i>Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic = Constituency outside proposal region</i>			
	46**	43**	51**	49**

† F statistics and significance of two-tailed tests with a null hypothesis of equal coefficients.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A13: Reestimation of models in main text with an interaction between development indicators in proposal region and in MPs' constituencies

	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>				
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	0.38** (0.12)		0.26** (0.035)	
Non-Hindi area autonomy proposal				
Developed area, i.e. higher literacy than average	-0.074** (0.022)		-0.068** (0.022)	
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area	-0.14** (0.021)		-0.14** (0.021)	
Pro-autonomy violence	-0.068** (0.022)		-0.067** (0.022)	
Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)	-0.044** (0.0082)		-0.041** (0.0083)	
Ln population of proposed autonomous area	-0.025** (0.0083)		-0.027** (0.0083)	
Population share of autonomy-seeking group	-0.20** (0.032)		-0.20** (0.032)	
Congress vote share in proposal area	-0.25** (0.059)		-0.24** (0.059)	
<i>MP/proposal dyad characteristics:</i>				
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.19 (0.11)		
Hindi constituency * Non-Hindi proposal			-0.21** (0.070)	-0.13* (0.067)
Developed area proposal * Developed constituency	0.033 (0.034)	0.0055 (0.031)	0.025 (0.034)	0.00097 (0.031)
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area and MP's constituency	0.0049 (0.042)	0.0012 (0.038)	0.0029 (0.042)	0.0012 (0.038)
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic	0.27** (0.028)	0.25** (0.025)	0.28** (0.028)	0.25** (0.026)
Constituency outside proposal region	0.12** (0.028)	0.11** (0.025)	0.12** (0.028)	0.11** (0.026)
Proposal fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
MP fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2458	2458	2458	2458
Adjusted R-squared	0.47	0.59	0.47	0.59
Additional hypothesis tests: †				
<i>Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic = Constituency outside proposal region</i>				
	43**	43**	43**	42**

†F statistics and significance of two-tailed tests with a null hypothesis of equal coefficients.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A14: Reestimation of models in main text including dummy variables for in-region, non-coethnic and out-of-region, non-coethnic MP/proposal dyads. The excluded category is all coethnic MP/proposal dyads.

	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29	Model 30
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>				
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	0.37** (0.12)			
Non-Hindi area autonomy proposal			-0.095** (0.036)	
Developed area, i.e. higher literacy than average	-0.059** (0.018)		-0.048* (0.019)	
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area	-0.14** (0.018)		-0.12** (0.019)	
Pro-autonomy violence	-0.070** (0.022)		0.0076 (0.020)	
Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)	-0.046** (0.0082)		-0.041** (0.0089)	
Ln population of proposed autonomous area	-0.027** (0.0082)		-0.043** (0.0083)	
Population share of autonomy-seeking group	-0.20** (0.032)		-0.17** (0.032)	
Congress vote share in proposal area	-0.25** (0.059)		-0.25** (0.060)	
<i>MP/proposal dyad characteristics:</i>				
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.18 (0.11)		
Hindi constituency * Non-Hindi proposal			-0.17* (0.079)	-0.18** (0.070)
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic	0.26** (0.027)	0.23** (0.024)	0.27** (0.028)	0.25** (0.025)
Constituency outside proposal region, not coethnic	0.099** (0.026)	0.088** (0.024)	0.13** (0.028)	0.11** (0.025)
Proposal fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
MP fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2458	2458	2458	2458
Adjusted R-squared	0.47	0.59	0.46	0.59
Additional hypothesis tests: †				
<i>Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic = Constituency outside proposal region</i>				
	47**	47**	41**	44**

†F statistics and significance of two-tailed tests with a null hypothesis of equal coefficients.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A15: OLS models of MP opposition to ethnoterritorial autonomy estimated without MP fixed effects and with MP partisanship variables

	Model 31	Model 32	Model 33	Model 34
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>				
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	0.49** (0.13)			
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal		-0.10* (0.042)		
Developed area, i.e. higher literacy than average	-0.096** (0.020)	-0.084** (0.021)		
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area	-0.14** (0.020)	-0.11** (0.021)		
Pro-autonomy violence	-0.088** (0.025)	0.0031 (0.023)		
Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)	-0.042** (0.0089)	-0.038** (0.0097)		
Ln population of proposed autonomous area	-0.040** (0.0092)	-0.060** (0.0092)		
Population share of autonomy-seeking group	-0.27** (0.034)	-0.24** (0.034)		
Congress vote share in proposal area	-0.26** (0.064)	-0.28** (0.065)		
<i>MP/proposal dyad characteristics:</i>				
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	-0.20 (0.14)			
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal		-0.17* (0.083)		
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic	0.40** (0.028)	0.41** (0.028)	0.24** (0.025)	0.24** (0.025)
Constituency outside proposal region	0.35** (0.025)	0.36** (0.025)	0.100** (0.025)	0.099** (0.025)
Hindu right MP * Non-Hindu proposal			0.34 (0.18)	
Hindu right MP * Non-Hindu proposal				-0.24 (0.14)
<i>MP characteristics:</i>				
Hindu majority constituency	0.10 (0.062)			
Hindu majority constituency		0.21** (0.076)		
Congress party	0.27** (0.024)	0.26** (0.025)		
Communist party	-0.17** (0.047)	-0.15** (0.047)		
Hindu right party	0.047 (0.061)	0.044 (0.061)		
Constant	1.1** (0.16)	1.5** (0.16)		
Proposal fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
MP fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2458	2458	2458	2458
Adjusted R-squared	0.63	0.63	0.59	0.59
Additional hypothesis tests: †				
<i>Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic = Constituency outside proposal region</i>				
	6.2*	5.7*	44**	44**

†F statistics and significance of two-tailed tests with a null hypothesis of equal coefficients.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

The role of pro-autonomy violence

Do proposal characteristics condition the correlation between violence and opposition? Model 35 interacts pro-autonomy violence with the dummy variables for non-Hindu area autonomy proposals, developed areas, and resource rich areas, and with the indicators for regional rivalries. It is not possible to examine an interaction between violence and Hindi language area demands. Before the Lok Sabha debates, there had been no cases of pro-autonomy violence for a proposal from a Hindi-majority area. Model 36 adds proposal fixed effects to Model 35. Proposal characteristics drop out of this model, which functions as a robustness test of variables measured at the level of MP/proposal dyad. The results in Models 35 and 36 are substantively similar.

All of the new interaction terms multiply the violence dummy variable by one of the factors that is thought to increase MP opposition to autonomy. If these factors also make MPs less conciliatory in the face of violence, the new interaction terms should have positive coefficients. Adding a positive coefficient to the negative coefficient on *Pro-autonomy violence* that opposition is decreasing by a smaller amount.

The results from Model 35 are best captured in Figure A1. The figure plots predicted differences in MP opposition to autonomy in a case of pro-autonomy violence compared to a case without such violence. The four panels plot that comparison according to other characteristics of autonomy proposals. For example, Figure A1a shows the difference in MP opposition to autonomy in case of violence in a Hindu-majority area (plotted as a circle) and the difference in case of violence in an area without a Hindu majority (plotted as a square).

One interpretation of the central nationalism thesis is that pro-autonomy violence by religious minorities is less sympathetic to central observers and produces a smaller move in the militants' favor. The data here are not consistent with that idea. As Figure A1a shows, the results actually run counter to expectations. MP opposition is 16% lower in case of violence in a Hindu-majority area. The decrease in opposition to autonomy is larger for non-Hindu areas; violence was associated with 41% lower opposition. This result adds to the conclusion that central nation-building had a more complex relationship to MP opinion than existing theories would predict.

Figure A1b looks at the interaction between violence and relatively developed areas. In the reference category, less developed areas, violence is associated with 16% less opposition to autonomy. The point estimate marked with a square in Figure A1b is the comparison among relatively developed areas in case of violence. There is no statistically significant difference in rates of MP opposition. The same holds for resource rich areas: among these areas, MP opposition was no different in case of pro-autonomy violence (Figure A1c).

Although the interaction terms between the violence and economics variables are positive, the model is still not consistent with the idea that the center was particularly opposed to autonomy for relatively wealthy areas. The interaction terms are not large and serve to cancel out the negative coefficient on relative development. The net result is that MP opposition to autonomy in case of violence was roughly the same for developed and underdeveloped areas. In cases without violence, opposition to autonomy was higher for underdeveloped areas. Similarly, in case of violence, there is no correlation between mineral resources and MP opposition to autonomy. In cases without violence, MP's oppose autonomy for areas without mineral resources.

Finally, Figure A1d implies that MPs' reactions to violence varied depending on their con-

stituencies' regional and ethnic ties to the proposal at issue. Violence is associated with less opposition to autonomy in all three of the region-based categories of MP/proposal dyads: the in-region, coethnic reference category (circle); MPs representing in-region, non-coethnic constituencies (square); and out-of-region MPs (triangle). However, the drop in opposition to autonomy in case of violence is much smaller among in-region, non-coethnic MPs than in the other two groups of MPs. In fact, MPs' opposition to in-region, non-coethnic proposals was virtually unchanged in case of violence. MPs responded to pro-autonomy violence outside of their region much more favorably. The final row of *F*-tests in Table A16 shows that the differences in reactions to violence among in-region, non-coethnic MPs versus out-of-region MPs are statistically significant. The regional rivalry variables can also be examined after adding proposal fixed effects (Model 36). In that model, the coefficients on the interaction terms support the same interpretation: violence was more likely to nudge an MP to accept an autonomy proposal from elsewhere in India than to decrease opposition to local, non-coethnic demands.

Table A16: Estimation of opposition to autonomy including violence interacted with central nationalism, economic factors, and regional rivalries


	Expectation	Model 35	Model 36
<i>Proposal characteristics:</i>			
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal	+	0.58** (0.14)	
Developed area, i.e. higher literacy than average	+	-0.095** (0.020)	
Oil or mineral resources in proposal area	+	-0.17** (0.020)	
Pro-autonomy violence	-	-0.16** (0.059)	
Distance to New Delhi (Ln km)		-0.045** (0.0081)	
Ln population of proposed autonomous area		-0.021* (0.0090)	
Population share of autonomy-seeking group		-0.22** (0.033)	
Congress vote share in proposal area		-0.22** (0.059)	
Non-Hindu area autonomy proposal * Violence	+	-0.25** (0.086)	
Developed area * Violence	+	0.17** (0.047)	
Oil or mineral resources * Violence	+	0.16** (0.055)	
<i>MP/proposal dyad characteristics:</i>			
Hindu constituency * Non-Hindu proposal	+	-0.044 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.11)
Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic	+	0.24** (0.032)	0.19** (0.029)
Constituency outside proposal region	+	0.13** (0.030)	0.10** (0.027)
In-region, non-coethnic * Violence	+	0.13* (0.060)	0.21** (0.055)
Out-of-region * Violence	?	-0.12* (0.052)	-0.029 (0.048)
Proposal fixed effects		No	Yes
MP fixed effects		Yes	Yes
Observations		2458	2458
Adjusted R-squared		0.48	0.60
Additional hypothesis tests:†			
<i>Constituency in proposal region but not coethnic = Constituency outside proposal region</i>			
		17**	15**
<i>In-region, non-coethnic * Violence = Out-of-region * Violence</i>			
		29**	32**

†F statistics and significance of two-tailed tests with a null hypothesis of equal coefficients.


* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Figure A1: Predicted differences in opposition to autonomy in case of pro-autonomy violence, with 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 35 (Table A16).


(a) Religious composition of proposal area



(b) Proposal area relative development



(c) Proposal area oil or mineral resources



(d) Regional and ethnic alignment of MP and proposal

