

National anthem protests and whites' views of black NFL players

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Abstract

Starting in 2016, NFL players' protests during the playing of the US national anthem sparked a debate about race and patriotism in American public life. I examine consumer polling on the popularity of NFL stars between 2015 and 2018. Among whites without college education, black players lost popularity relative to white players even if they did not participate in the protests. In fact, whites without college education penalized black protestors and black non-protestors by approximately the same amount. I explain this undifferentiated negative response to the anthem controversy by pointing to the intersection of the literatures on racial resentment, authority, and patriotism. Whites who are less educated are more likely to manifest high levels of patriarchal patriotism and racial resentment. Racially-resentful whites believe that most black Americans do not respect American traditions and moral authority. That belief provides a link from debates over patriotism to a generalized disaffinity for black celebrities.

In August 2016, Colin Kaepernick, reserve quarterback with the National Football League's (NFL) San Francisco 49ers, began a protest against racial inequality, discrimination, and police violence. He sat or knelt during the playing of the national anthem prior to NFL games. The protests drew modest attention until fall 2017, when President Trump argued team owners should fire players who would not stand for the national anthem. Trump's speech prompted solidarity with Kaepernick: "participation in anthem protests soared in the subsequent weekend's games" (Niven 2019, p. 998). 14% of NFL players participated in the protests at some point in the 2017 season; 91% of the protestors were African-American (Niven 2019). Players who joined the protests, especially in 2017, argued that Kaepernick and other protestors had been treated unfairly by the League and scapegoated by President Trump.

The protests highlighted the salience of professional sports in US public life (Gift and Miner 2017). In fall 2017, 90% of US adults told pollsters they were aware of the protests (McCarthy 2017). Negative views of the NFL soared among Trump-voters but were unchanged among Clinton-voters (Quealy 2017). The number of Republicans and independents who said they were NFL fans fell 12-15% (Jones 2017).¹

Public reaction to the NFL protests split by race (Intravia, A. R. Piquero, and N. L. Piquero 2018). The protests were very popular with black Americans, with 74% approving in a 2016 poll (Quinnipiac University 2016). C. C. Towler, Crawford, and Bennett (2020) argue that the positive impression of Kaepernick's actions was profound enough to inspire new political activism among African-Americans (see also: Intravia, A. R. Piquero, N. L. Piquero, and Byers 2019). Protestors against police violence in the summer

¹See also Ipsos (2017), Morning Consult/Politico (2018), and ssrs (2017).

of 2020 continue to use kneeling on a single knee as an expression of solidarity.

Non-Hispanic white Americans reacted in the opposite fashion. A majority objected to the protests (Quinnipiac University 2016). Public criticism of the protestors focused on the method of dissent, arguing that not standing during the anthem was “violating American values and being un-American” (Schmidt et al. 2019, p. 662). Kneeling during the national anthem quickly became a trope in rightwing cultural grievance. In 2018, the NFL management changed its rules to end player protests during the national anthem.² The Olympic Committee banned kneeling and other protest during anthem ceremonies in preparation for aborted 2020 games in Japan.

White Americans were also mostly skeptical of the protestors’ call for racial justice, particularly police reform. In a 2016 poll, 75% of whites thought police treat racial and ethnic groups equally. 85% of whites agreed that blacks’ “long-standing bias” against the police explained protest movements like Black Lives Matter (Morin and Stepler 2016). Despite white hostility to Kaepernick’s cause, public debate focused on his methods. Arguably, the discussion of whether kneeling during the anthem is unpatriotic was “a way to avoid completely discussions on racism” (Graber and Vasudevan 2019, p. 1).

This media framing also offers a false choice between white objections to protestors’ racial justice agenda versus objections to their methods. Many white Americans’ beliefs about patriotism, American moral authority, and race cannot be disentwined. One of the premises of white racial resentment is that African-Americans do not respect American tradition and authority.

This article presents a stark implication of the way anti-black and pro-authority atti-

²In advance of the 2020 season, the NFL management has sanctioned several forms of symbolic protests.

tudes cluster among whites. The debate over whether black NFLers were failing to fulfill the duties of patriotism played on a belief racially resentment whites already held: namely, that black Americans are insufficiently appreciative of the US. Among whites without college education, the popularity of black NFL players fell about 7% compared to white NFLers, regardless of whether a black player had protested during the anthem. This is a sub-population that is above average in pro-authority attitudes and in racial resentment.

This article is the first study of public reaction to the NFL protests that includes data on attitudes toward non-protesting black players, complementing the wealth of information on approval of the protests, Kaepernick, the NFL ownership and the NFL brand (CNN 2017; Morning Consult/Politico 2018). I contribute to the literature on black celebrity activism (Jackson 2014; Marsh, Hart, and Tindall 2010) by clarifying the nature of the backlash against these figures. Most importantly, I provide information about a milestone in the evolving protest movement against racial inequality in US policing. Some polling suggests that American public opinion on matters of race and policing is changing rapidly. This study offers some benchmarks regarding past public reaction to racial justice protests.

1 The anthem protests, race, and patriotism

The NFL sits on America's racial and political faultlines. In 2017, 70% of NFL players were African-American. Most of the coaches and 34 of 36 team owners were white. At the same time, the League is extremely popular in almost every American demographic, which translates to a politically and racially diverse fan base. Before the protests, 65-70% of independents, Republicans, and Democrats called themselves NFL fans (Jones 2017).

African-Americans are a bigger share in the NFL fan base than in the population. On the other hand, white fans account for 80% of NFL stadium attendance and 70% of the NFL's television audience (Kertscher 2017).

Despite its broad fan base, NFL branding emphasizes conservative themes such as nationalism and militarism (M. L. Butterworth and Moskal 2009; Fischer 2014; Jenkins 2013). Most League events incorporate choreographed recognition for the US military, police, and/or first responders (M. Butterworth 2008; Sorek and White 2016). The anthem protests disrupted this branding. For example, Vice President Mike Pence orchestrated a walk-out from an Indianapolis Colts game, explaining "President Trump and I will not dignify any event that disrespects our soldiers, our Flag, and our National Anthem" (Watkins 2017). For critics, the NFL was allowing dissent in a moment reserved for acknowledging US national pride and the US military in particular.

Media coverage of the NFL player protests emphasized critics' concerns about patriotism and moral authority. In a content analysis, Montez de Oca and Suh (2019) find that the most common media framings for the protestors used competing definitions of patriotism. Opponents of the protests emphasized the loyalty and deference citizens owe to protective institutions of the state; the authors call this "patriarchal patriotism." Graber and Vasudevan (2019) argue journalists implicitly boosted this critique by producing many articles "specifically on military members' reaction to Kaepernick's demonstration" (11).

The competing, sympathetic media frame for the protests emphasized "constructive" patriotism, which holds that citizens have both a right and a duty to oppose perceived shortcomings of the state (Graber and Vasudevan 2019; Montez de Oca and Suh 2019). This framing still did not address the protestors' cause explicitly. In fact, Melton (2019)

found that about 30% of the coverage of the NFL protests did not mention the protestors' race-related grievances at all. Coverage "divert[ed] the focus on racism and redirect[ed] it toward the surrogate topic of patriotism" (Graber and Vasudevan 2019, p. 11).

As a rhetorical device, framing the NFL protest controversy in terms of patriotism sidesteps discussion of race. However, there is no separating these topics for many Americans. Racially resentful whites believe that blacks lack respect for American traditions and institutions. For these whites, a debate over the patriotism of particular black celebrities primes beliefs about endemic flaws in African-American culture.

1.1 What we talk about when we talk about patriotism

Political psychologists distinguish positive attachment to one's country (patriotism) from intolerance for criticism of it (patriarchal or blind patriotism). Patriarchal or "blind" patriotism is "unquestioning positive evaluation" of one's country, "staunch support for its actions, and intolerance of criticism" (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999, p. 156). Patriarchal patriotism implies affinity for authority and dislike of dissent. Affinity for authority and patriarchal patriotism are both, in turn, correlated with exclusionary nationalism and dislike of out-groups. These relationships hold in the US and elsewhere (Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Livi et al. 2014; Napier and Jost 2008; Peña and Sidanius 2002; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999).

In surveys, large majorities of Americans describe patriotism primarily in terms of respect for American moral authority and tradition (Morales 2008). Constructive patriotism is much less popular. For example, only 30% of Americans told Gallup in 2008 that protesting US policies reveals "a great deal" of patriotism (Morales 2008).

Non-Hispanic whites who are sympathetic to patriarchal patriotism are also likely to see the US in ethnocentric terms. In implicit association tests, white Americans associate the term “American” with whiteness and this relationship is stronger for whites who identify more with America (Devos and Banaji 2005).³ For people who think of whites “as prototypical Americans,” national symbols may be “commensurate with negative feelings toward” other races (Parker, Sawyer, and C. Towler 2009, p. 197).

1.2 American authority and white racial resentment

While patriarchal patriotism values deference to American moral authority, white racial resentment includes the belief about African-Americans are particularly lacking in that department. For racially resentful whites, debates about the duties of patriarchal patriotism activates a source of anger at African-Americans writ large.

Racially resentful whites believe two premises about the contemporary US: “African Americans no longer face much discrimination” and “their disadvantage mainly reflects their poor work ethic” (Tesler 2016, p. 21). In this view, charges of racism are a pretext for excusing failures and obtaining unearned advantages (Perry, Whitehead, and J. T. Davis 2019; Wilson and D. W. Davis 2011).

Public expressions of anger over the NFL protests displayed this kind of skepticism about ongoing racism. For example, an analysis of Facebook discussions of Kaepernick’s protest found this comment:

Black people are their own worst enemy. Oppression is a myth propagated by people like you, Colin, with IQs about one tick above an ice cube. There

³See also Kalmoe and Gross (2016).

are no slaves anymore and when there were everyone forgets to mention all of the Black slave masters of their own people (Quoted in Schmidt et al. 2019, p. 665).

A *Miami Herald* op-ed similarly questioned the protests on the grounds that they were aimed at isolated problems: “I would not refuse to stand for the anthem in a broad-brush protest against American ‘oppression’ because of the actions of a very small percentage of local bad cops” (Quoted in Graber and Vasudevan 2019, p. 10). The belief that there is not ongoing discrimination against blacks reinforces confidence in the moral authority of US institutions and, by extension, the duties of patriarchal patriotism.

Racially resentful whites see black culture as rejecting the moral and political authority of American society (Kinder and Sears 1981). Refusal to conform to American norms like individualism and a strong work ethic keeps blacks from advancing (Banks 2014, p. 5). Calling the NFL protestors unpatriotic invokes the “cultural pathology arguments that indict black Americans as partially or largely responsible for their plight” (Burkey and Zamalin 2016, p. 373).

White beliefs about the cultural shortcomings of African-Americans are ingrained in American sports culture. Sports journalism and sports-themed popular entertainment routinely celebrates sports as a remedy for pathologies of black culture (Billings 2004; Oriard 2010). Sports are portrayed as a means for social mobility. The structure and discipline of organized sports remedies defects in black childrearing, including a lack of structure and authority figures (Hartmann 2012).

During the NFL protests, the presumption that America and American sports are especially beneficial for black people was manifested in claims that Kaepernick and other

protestors were ungrateful. The “ingratitude” framing was deployed by President Trump, who argued via Twitter that “If a player wants the privilege of making millions of dollars in the NFL, or other leagues, he or she should not be allowed to disrespect our great American flag” (Quoted in Fritze 2018). This idea appeared in comments on Facebook as well:

America has been so great to you and yet you refuse to stand up for the National Anthem (Quoted in Schmidt et al. 2019, p. 662).

Do us all a favor and get out of the country that has made you rich (Quoted in Schmidt et al. 2019, p. 664).

Montez de Oca and Suh (2019) found that roughly 9% of anti-protest social media contained a version of the “love it or leave it” argument, suggesting that any person critical of the US “hates the nation and should give up their citizenship” (9).

1.3 Anthem protests and undifferentiated racial resentment

Objections to the anthem protests on grounds of patriotism are not separable from common white beliefs about race. Racially resentful whites believe African-Americans disrespect American tradition and authority. Public debate about the patriotism of black protestors activated these beliefs about flaws characteristic of all black people.

For individuals who see patriotism in patriarchal terms and feel high levels of racial resentment, the NFL protests were likely to depress the popularity of all black players in the League, even blacks who did not protest. The ideal data to test this claim would be surveys measuring NFL player popularity, racial resentment, and patriarchal patriotism. Lacking

that, I take advantage of known correlations between education and attitudes about patriarchal patriotism and race. Patriarchal patriotism is most highly valued by less educated Americans (Morales 2008), although it is worth noting that a large majority of Americans view patriotism in these pro-authority terms. Racial resentment also correlates with less formal education, at least among non-Hispanic whites (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019; Federico and Aguilera 2019; Tuch and Hughes 2011).

I expect that black NFL players lost popularity among less educated whites during the anthem protests even if they did not participate. Low education is serving here as a known correlate of patriarchal patriotism and white racial resentment. If those variables were observed directly, I would expect them to supersede education as a predictor of anger against non-protesting black NFL stars.

2 Consumer polling on player popularity

I use consumer polling to find out if the popularity of black and white NFL players changed between 2015 and 2018. The data was produced by Marking Evaluations, Inc. as part of a product called Sports Q. This firm specializes in consumer sentiment data intended for marketing decisions like choosing a celebrity spokesperson. This section explains the collection and structure of this data and how I have adapted it to research changes in the popularity of NFL players.

2.1 Survey timing and respondents

Sports Q gathers data on about seventy active NFL players annually between the Super Bowl, in February, and the draft of college players a few weeks later. I compare the 2015 version of the survey conducted before Kaepernick’s protests began to the 2018 survey in the spring following the 2017-2018 NFL season. President Trump’s call to fire the protestors occurred in fall 2017.

Sports Q respondents are drawn from a pre-recruited panel of US residents who complete the survey online. The sample is weighted to approximate the population of US residents in terms of sex, age (16-64), race, and region of the country, as defined in the US census. I analyzed only US adults, ages 18 to 64, and calculated custom survey weights to maintain representativeness on census region, race, sex, and age. Region data is provided by the survey firm. Sex and age (in years) are self-reported.

Race and ethnicity are measured in two questions, in a style similar to the 2010 US Census, allowing for non-response and free response. I have organized the respondents who provided this information into four categories: “white, non-Hispanic”, “black, non-Hispanic”, “Asian, non-Hispanic,” and “Hispanic, any race.”

The survey unfortunately does not ask about political parties, political attitudes, or religious identity. However, education is available and that is a known correlate of attitudes toward patriotism, authority and race. The education question asks respondents “What is the highest level of education you have completed?” and offers the following options: “Grade school,” “High school,” “Some college,” or “College grad or more.” The first two categories are combined into a “high school or less” education category and the last two

responses are combined into a “some college” education category.

2.2 Measuring player popularity

The bulk of the Sports Q survey is about the popularity of public figures: active and retired athletes, coaches, sports journalists and commentators from multiple sports. Respondents are first asked if an individual is “someone you have definitely seen or heard of before.” If the answer is yes, later in the survey the respondent is prompted: “Using the scale points below, please indicate your opinion of” the individual. The offered scale is: “Poor”, “Fair”, “Good”, “Very Good”, and “One of your favorites.” I coded approval as a rating of “Good” or better.

The data is organized into player/respondent dyads. Respondents’ opinions of players are captured in a 0/1 variable for approval. Approval is coded as missing if the respondent did not know the player.

2.3 Which players are in the survey?

My data incorporate 43 NFL players who were included in both the 2015 and 2018 Sports Q surveys. These individuals were not necessarily active in both the 2014–15 and 2017–18 NFL seasons immediately prior to the two surveys. Kaepernick, for example, was active in 2015 and not 2018 but is included in both the 2015 and 2018 surveys. Of these 43 players, 21 are black, 22 are white. Nine of the black players knelt, sat, raised a fist, or stayed in the locker room for the national anthem before at least one game during the 2016 or 2017 seasons. None of the white players participated in those ways. There were non-African American NFLers who participated in the protests (Niven 2019) but none of them are in

the Sports Q data.

The Sports Q survey cannot tell us how popular NFL players are in general. These 43 players are a fraction of the total number of people who played in the NFL in recent years. Official rosters from 2015 only included 2,877 players. Sports Q polling is intended to inform marketing and does not bother to ask about people who are obscure or obviously disliked. Most of the players in the survey have been very successful and play in high profile positions. The marketers know their business: every NFL player they included in the 2018 survey was rated “good” or better by a majority of the people who knew of him. The data therefore have a systematic bias toward popularity.

It is likewise possible that trends in the popularity of all NFL players do not match what I report below. For example, the result I emphasize is that the popularity of non-protesting black players fell relative to non-protesting white players among less-educated whites. That conclusion does not reflect white and black non-protestors who are not in Sports Q. If those black non-protestors had no change in popularity relative to whites or gained popularity relative to whites, on average, their inclusion might reverse my findings. However, it is more likely that a survey that asked about more NFL players, let alone all of them, would collect mostly non-responses. Most of the almost three thousand people who appear on an NFL roster in a particular season are not well known. NFL careers are very short, less than three seasons on average. Even the stars included in Sports Q are recognized by only 10–40% of respondents.

The marketers’ choice of players to put in the survey gives a sense of how race and player popularity are correlated. The survey includes about 3% of the white players in the NFL and less than 1% of the total number of black players. After the anthem protests, the

marketers shifted toward including even more white players. In 2015, they surveyed about a group of players that was 40% white. By 2018, the pool of players marketers expected to be mega-popular was 50% white.

3 Setting up a difference-in-difference analysis

This section uses difference-in-difference analysis to compare players' popularity in 2018 to their own popularity before the anthem protests started. A differences-in-differences set-up is appropriate because NFL stars have wide differences in popularity based in part on race and factors correlated with race, as well as performance, past and current teams, and public persona. Black football players face bias in media coverage, scouting, and personnel decisions (Conlin and Emerson 2006; Dufur and Feinberg 2009; Mercurio and Filak 2010; Woodward 2004). On-field positions—e.g., defensive backs versus offensive receivers—influence visibility and popularity but are also highly correlated with race (Kaiser, D. Williams, and Norwood 2016; McKnight 2017; Pitts and Yost 2013; R. L. Williams and Youssef 1979).

There may also be endogeneity between player popularity and the decision to protest. Niven (2019) argues that economically vulnerable players were less likely to participate in the protests. Some variation in player vulnerability is captured in the player fixed effects. In robustness checks I control for recent team and player performance to capture potential endogeneity between career security and protest behavior.

I estimate difference-in-differences regressions in which the dependent variable is the change in a player's popularity between 2015 and 2018. The ordinary least squares (OLS)

equation estimated is:

$$O_{ip} = \beta_1 A_p y_i + \beta_2 a_p y_i + \gamma_p + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{ip} \quad (1)$$

Where:

- O_{pi} is the opinion of player p given by respondent i
- A_p is a dummy variable for a black player who participated in the protests
- a_p is a dummy variable for a black player who did not participate in the protests
- y_i is the year that the respondent took the survey. $y_i = 0$ for respondents to the 2015 survey and $y_i = 1$ for respondents to the 2018 survey.
- γ_p is a player fixed effect.
- η_i is a respondent fixed effect.

Recall that among the players in the survey, only black NFLers participated in the protests. The variables A_i and a_i are “turned off and on” by the interaction with y_i , the year of the survey. An uninteracted variable for players’ race is absorbed by the player fixed effects. The uninteracted term for survey year is absorbed in the respondent fixed effect.

The regression models include fixed effects for the respondents to capture differences in overall attitudes toward the NFL and how respondents interpreted the survey question, which is vague. These terms also capture the differences in the popularity of the NFL as a whole in the 2015 respondent pool versus 2018 respondent pool.

The interpretation of the regression coefficients is summarized in Table 1. The first quantity of interest is the estimated change, 2015 to 2018, in the popularity gap between

Table 1: Coefficient interpretation

| Equation | Popularity compared to white non-protestors of ... | Respondent group | Estimated change, 2015–2018 |
|----------|--|------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1 | Black protestors | All | $\hat{\beta}_1$ |
| | Black non-protestors | All | $\hat{\beta}_2$ |
| 2 | Black protestors | $x_i = 0$ | $\hat{\beta}_1$ |
| | Black protestors | $x_i = 1$ | $\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_2$ |
| | Black non-protestors | $x_i = 0$ | $\hat{\beta}_3$ |
| | Black non-protestors | $x_i = 1$ | $\hat{\beta}_3 + \hat{\beta}_4$ |

white non-protestors and black protestors: $\hat{\beta}_1$. The second quantity of interest is $\hat{\beta}_2$, the estimated change, 2015 to 2018, in the popularity gap between white non-protestors and black non-protestors.

I also modify equation 1 to calculate changes in popularity in different respondent subgroups. For example, if x_i represents a dummy variable for some respondent trait, I could estimate:

$$O_{ip} = \beta_1 A_p y_i + \beta_2 a_p y_i + \beta_3 A_p y_i x_i + \beta_4 a_p y_i x_i + \beta_5 A_p x_i + \beta_6 a_p x_i + \gamma_p + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{ip} \quad (2)$$

An interaction term of $x_i y_i$ is absorbed by the respondent fixed effect, η_i . For the subgroup of respondents for which $x_i = 0$, $\hat{\beta}_1$ is the estimated change in the relative popularity of black protestors versus white non-protestors. $\hat{\beta}_3$ is the change in relative popularity of black non-protestors compared to white non-protestors. For the subgroup of respondents for which $x_i = 1$, the change in relative popularity of black protestors versus white non-protestors is $\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_2$. The change in relative popularity of black non-protestors versus

white non-protestors is $\hat{\beta}_3 + \hat{\beta}_4$.

Obviously, the necessity of adding coefficients makes statistical tables of regression results cumbersome to read. I reserve those tables for the Appendix and present estimates graphically in the main text.

4 Results I: Protestors lost popularity

Protestors lost popularity relative to white NFL non-protestors. The fall-off in protestors' popularity was clearest among white non-Hispanics. Protestor popularity slipped among both less and more educated whites but the penalty was bigger among non-college educated whites. Thus, the marketing data tell a similar story to public opinion polls taken at the same time: The protests and the protesting players were viewed unfavorably by most whites. This correspondence should increase confidence that the marketing data is sound.

4.1 Interpreting changes in protestor popularity

Figure 1a shows how the popularity of black protestors changed relative to white NFL players between 2015 and 2018. The top-most estimate is the change in popularity among the general population of black protestors between 2015 and 2018 compared to the change in popularity of white players. Black protestors lost relative popularity, so the point estimate appears to the left of the dotted vertical line placed at zero. I converted the estimates of lost popularity to percentages to ease interpretation. Black protestors' favorability ratings dropped an average of 1.9% relative to white players between 2015 and 2018.

The protestors' lost relative popularity is statistically significant by conventional stan-


dards. The width of the bar around the point estimate shows a traditional 95% confidence interval, which does not intersect zero. I also calculated a more conservative test. I am estimating player popularity in a large number of subgroups, increasing the possibility of coincidental statistically significant results. To control this false discovery rate, I recalculated statistical significance using the method proposed by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). These tests are reflected in the color of the point estimates and confidence intervals in Figure 1a. Point estimates and confidence intervals are gray if they are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level after the correction for multiple comparisons. Estimates that are significant even after correction for multiple comparison are plotted in black. Note that the estimate of protestors' lost popularity in the general population is plotted in black, meaning it remains statistically significant after correction for multiple comparisons.

4.2 Protestor popularity by race and education of respondent

Figure 1a goes on to break respondents into groups by race, confirming that lost popularity in the general population was clearest among non-Hispanic whites. Protestors had a decrease in popularity among Asian-Americans and an increase in popularity among Hispanics and African-Americans. However, the Sports Q survey does not draw large samples of any of these demographics. Therefore, estimates of changes in player popularity among people of color are highly uncertain and miss statistical significance in all three instances.

The sample of non-Hispanic whites is larger and that result can be interpreted more confidently. Protestors lost more popularity with whites than in the general population, shedding 3.1% of their approval rating relative to white NFLers. This drop-off in popular-

Figure 1: Changes in popularity of black NFL stars relative to white NFL stars, disaggregated by whether players participated in the anthem protests in 2016/17 or 2017/18 and by respondent characteristics



ity is statistically significant even with correction for multiple comparison.

The final two estimates in Figure 1a are based on subsetting non-Hispanic whites by education level. Protestors lost more popularity among high school-educated whites (-7.1%) compared to college-educated whites (-1.7%). The large loss of popularity among less educated whites is statistically significant.

5 Results II: White resentment of non-protesting black players

Research on patriarchal patriotism and racial resentment suggest that some whites would feel undifferentiated anger toward black NFLers during the anthem protests. Here, I show evidence that whites without college education expressed less affinity for all black NFL players in 2018 compared to 2015.

Figure 1b shows the results of an analysis analogous to Figure 1a except that it compares the change in popularity of non-protesting black NFLers to white (also non-protesting) players. The top-most circle shows there was essentially no change in the general population in terms of the relative popularity of black and white non-protestors. The point estimate implies black non-protestors lost a third-of-a-percent of relative popularity but the confidence interval spans zero.

The results for non-protestors are then reported by race, where no clear popularity penalty emerges. Non-protestor popularity dropped sharply among Asian-Americans (-11%); the drop is statistically significant under traditional tests but not after correction for multiple comparisons. This drop in popularity among Asian-Americans is, counter-

intuitively, larger than the drop in protestor popularity in the same population (-2.5%). Even post hoc it is difficult to come up with a logic that would explain why the anthem protests would make cost both protestors and black non-protestors popularity and penalize the non-protestors more severely. The prudent interpretation of the results for Asian American respondents is that they are merely suggestive non-findings.

Among black and Hispanic respondents, non-protesting black players' popularity did not change much between 2015 and 2018 relative to white players. The estimated movements were small and statistically uncertain. Non-Hispanic whites' views of the non-protesting black players were, in aggregate, also roughly unchanged.

However, black non-protestors did lose popularity in one demographic: non-Hispanic whites without college education. This group rated non-protesting black players 6.9% lower compared to white non-protesting players in 2018 versus 2015. This drop is almost identical to the 7.1% drop in approval that protesting black players experienced in this demographic. The undifferentiated popularity penalty for black NFL players suggests that the anthem protests activated broad racial resentments for some whites.

The next three subsections explore public reactions to the NFL protests in more detail, focusing on factors that might overturn the key result of lost popularity for black non-protestors among less-educated whites.

6 Additional analysis: Familiarity

The anthem protests changed players' notoriety as well as their popularity. League stars, especially black players, were queried about their reaction to the protests in press confer-

ences throughout the 2017-2018 season, even if they did not participate. The profile of these players may have increased as a result, particularly among non-fans.


That change in notoriety means that in 2018 a higher portion of respondents said they knew who these players were and then had the chance to answer the approval question on the survey. It may be that these less-engaged NFL observers answered the approval questions in systematically different ways than more-engaged NFL observers. Without a true panel of respondents, I cannot rule that possibility out. The reactions of longer-term NFL observers may be obscured by people who only learned about these players due to the protests. That distinction probably matters more to NFL management than the broader politics of the anthem protests.

Nonetheless, Figure 2 explores respondents' familiarity with NFL players in two ways. The first panel (2a) shows the change in the percent of people who said they had heard of a player between 2015 and 2018. Black protestors and non-protestors are compared to white players in terms the likelihood that their names were familiar to a respondent. Protestors' change in relative popularity is graphed with square points. The circular points are popularity changes for non-protesting black players.


The anthem protests raised the profile of black NFL players relative to white players in the general population (Figure 2a). Recognition of the protestors' names increased 1.2% and non-protesting black players got a 1.8% bump in familiarity. These changes are small but precisely estimated and achieve statistical significance. Continuing down Figure 2a, there are increases in familiarity with black players in every racial demographic and among whites at low and high education levels, although these changes are not all distinguishable from zero. Among black and Hispanic respondents, there was a statistically significant

Figure 2: Incorporating familiarity with NFL stars into estimates of changing popularity

(a) Familiarity with black protestors and non-protestors relative to white players



(b) Changes in relative player popularity after treating non-familiarity as a neutral response



increase in familiarity with non-protestors' names.

Whites without college education show the smallest change in familiarity with the black non-protestors. Whites at lower and higher levels of education had a similarly sized increase in their familiarity with the protestors. However, college-educated whites gained more familiarity with the names of the non-protestors. Black non-protestors' notoriety relative to white players increased by more among college-educated whites (+2%) than among whites without college education (+0.2%).

The upshot of this is that the reactions to black NFL players in 2018 do reflect increased player visibility in most demographics. However, less-educated whites stand out for being the group that had the smallest increase in familiarity with the names of non-protesting black players. The popularity penalty for black non-protestors in this demographic was probably not due to the expansion of the pool of people who knew of them. On the other hand, it is possible that reactions to the NFL protests among people of color and college-educated whites are being influenced by the increased number of people in those demographics who had heard of these players.

Figure 2b explores this puzzle of expanded notoriety by reanalyzing player approval ratings while including non-familiarity as a neutral response. Respondents' answers are placed on the following scale running from -2 to 3: -2 (Poor), -1 (Fair), 0 (Have not heard of player), 1 (Good), 2 (Very Good), or 3 (One of your favorites).

Taking non-familiarity into account in this way primarily mutes the changes in player popularity seen earlier (compare Figures 2b and 1a–b). The losses of protester popularity in the general population and among non-Hispanic whites are no longer statistically significant. However, changing the dependent variable does not overturn the key result: both

protesting and non-protesting black players lost popularity among non-college educated whites and these drops are statistically distinguishable from zero. The robustness of the result may reflect the relatively small changes in familiarity with NFL players among less-educated whites (Figure 2a). Or less-educated whites who knew of these players in 2015 and those who learned about these players names between 2015 and 2018 tended to react in the same manner, on average, expressing more dislike of black NFL players, protestors and non-protestors alike.

7 Additional analysis: Factors correlated with education

Whites without college education are older and have lower incomes, on average, than whites with some college experience. Respondents' ages and incomes are captured via respondent fixed effects. However, age and income are also well-studied correlates of public opinion and incorporating them in conjunction with education might influence interpretation of the results above.

Older whites are more likely to express patriarchal patriotism (Morales 2008) and racial resentment (xxx) on surveys. Age and less education are also correlated, so we may learn something by dividing whites by age cohort and education levels simultaneously. In the appendix, I analyze whites in three age cohorts: 18–34, 35–49, and 50–64.

The correlation between less education and lower incomes should mitigate against finding a relationship between lower education and resentment of black NFL players. Higher incomes are correlated with more racial resentment among non-Hispanic whites (Federico and Aguilera 2019). Nonetheless, I conducted an analysis that distinguished

whites by education and income levels simultaneously. Sports Q respondents report their household income using ranges. I categorized “high income” respondents as those reporting a household income above the US median at the time of the survey.

The appendix includes estimates of changes in protesting and non-protesting black NFLers popularity among non-Hispanics whites disaggregated by age, income, age and education in tandem, and income interacted with education (see Figure 4 and Tables 4–6). The relationship between less education and lost popularity for both protestors and black non-protestors is still apparent. Within each age band, less education is correlated with more negative views of the NFL protestors and non-protesting black NFLers relative to white players. Within each income tier, less education likewise predicts more negative views of black NFLers, regardless of their participation in the anthem protests.

Consistent with existing findings tying white racial resentment to higher incomes, the popularity penalty for non-protesting black players was strongest among higher income whites without college education. Black non-protestors lost about 6.4% of their relative popularity among whites that were less educated but also wealthy. This penalty is statistically significant and substantively similar to the 7.4% drop in popularity the protestors faced in this demographic. The negative reaction to black non-protestors among whites without college education and low incomes was smaller (-2.3%) and statistically insignificant.

8 Additional analysis: Recent performance

Finally, as noted above, players' decisions to participate in the anthem protests were not exogenous. The owners of individual NFL teams took more and less punitive stances on protesting. Niven (2019) suggests that players with more career security were more likely to protest. Owners' policies and players' recent performance might have influenced both protest behavior and public opinion.

Adding team fixed effects to the analysis of player popularity is straight forward. Player career security is coarsely captured in player fixed effects. However, there may have been important changes in player performance between 2015 and 2018. Assessing that possibility raises its own problems, however. The statistics measuring effectiveness at each position on the field are not comparable. The major end-of-season awards for individual NFL players are allocated through voting by journalists, coaches, peers, and fans, all of whom may have been swayed by the protests.

The final analysis in the appendix (Figure 5 and Table 7) includes both team fixed effects and an "Award" variable noting whether a player was in the Pro Bowl or All-Pro selections after the 2015-16 seasons and after the 2017-18 seasons.⁴ Adding this information to the regressions does not overturn the key finding from my analysis: both

⁴The Pro Bowl is an exhibition game played by league stars in conjunction with the Super Bowl. Players are selected through voting by coaches, players, and, starting in 1995, an online poll for fans. Each of these electorates is equally weighted in the selection process. To create two complete teams for exhibition play, multiple players are chosen for each on-field position. Players who do not participate in the game due to injuries or because their team has advanced to the Super Bowl are still considered Pro Bowlers. Anyone who declines an invitation to the Pro Bowl on other grounds is not.

The All-Pro team is chosen by a panel of Associated Press members. They select a best player and runner-up for only the high-profile positions. The number of All-Pro selections is about one-fourth the number of Pro Bowl selections.

protesting and non-protesting black NFL players lost popularity among whites without college education during the anthem controversy.

9 Conclusions

A majority of non-Hispanic whites were dismayed in 2016–17 by NFL players kneeling during the playing of the national anthem. That disapproval could be explained by qualms about the mode of protest, skepticism toward the protestors' cause, or racial resentment. In this article, I use data on the popularity of star NFL players to highlight how attitudes about patriotism and race were intertwined in non-Hispanic whites' rejection of the protests. White racial resentment includes the belief that African-Americans do not respect American tradition and authority. Once the NFL protests activated that narrative, people whose beliefs ran toward patriarchal patriotism and racial resentment soured on all black NFL players, even non-protestors.

I use education levels to isolate a group of non-Hispanic whites known to display high levels of patriarchal patriotism and racial resentment. As expected, among whites without college education protesting and non-protesting African-American NFL stars lost popularity relative to white players.

Lost popularity is potentially significant for black football players' livelihoods. Consumer data like the surveys I use here are a basis for decisions about endorsements and licensing deals. Losing points with whites in these polls could mean a tangible financial penalty for black NFL players. My findings also shed light on the incentives of NFL owners. Leaked documents reveal that the owners commissioned polling about the impact of

player protests on the League brand. That exercise may have alerted them to growing resentment of black NFL players.

In summer 2020, players in the National Basketball Association staged a wildcat strike in response to the shooting of Jason Blake in Kenosha, Wisconsin. The players won concessions from the League, such as a commitment to use team stadiums as polling places. Initial polls suggest their protest was popular with a plurality of Americans. At the same time, President Trump criticized the NBA players and is poised to reactivate his campaign against NFL athletes' participation in protests of racial injustice when football resumes.

The results here clarify why protests in the NFL are so salient in Trump's base of whites without college education, even as general public opinion has shifted somewhat in favor of racial justice protests. White racial resentment, which is more common in this population than other demographics, includes the belief that African Americans disrespect American moral authority. When politicians discuss the anthem protests in the language of patriarchal patriotism they simultaneously prime a narrative of black inferiority that has currency among racially resentful whites.

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National anthem protests and whites' views of black NFL players

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Supplementary Materials

Table 2: OLS models of player popularity 2015 and 2018 (See Figures 1a and b)

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|--|---------|----------|----------|
| Black protestor * 2018 | -0.019* | -0.031** | 0.009 |
| | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.015) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Asian respondent | | 0.006 | |
| | | (0.045) | |
| Black protestor * Asian respondent | | 0.074** | |
| | | (0.027) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Black respondent | | 0.038 | |
| | | (0.023) | |
| Black protestor * Black respondent | | 0.068** | |
| | | (0.016) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Hispanic respondent | | 0.048 | |
| | | (0.026) | |
| Black protestor * Hispanic respondent | | 0.026 | |
| | | (0.016) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.080** |
| | | | (0.022) |
| Black protestor * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.012 |
| | | | (0.016) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.026 |
| | | | (0.020) |
| Black protestor * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.041** |
| | | | (0.015) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 | -0.003 | -0.006 | -0.008 |
| | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.014) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Asian respondent | | -0.101* | |
| | | (0.049) | |
| Black non-protestor * Asian respondent | | 0.063* | |
| | | (0.026) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Black respondent | | -0.014 | |
| | | (0.021) | |
| Black non-protestor * Black respondent | | 0.085** | |
| | | (0.016) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Hispanic respondent | | 0.022 | |
| | | (0.023) | |
| Black non-protestor * Hispanic respondent | | 0.043** | |
| | | (0.014) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.027 |
| | | | (0.021) |
| Black non-protestor * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.061** |
| | | | (0.012) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White college-educated respondent | | | 0.013 |
| | | | (0.018) |
| Black non-protestor * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.068** |
| | | | (0.011) |
| Player fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Respondent fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 51433 | 51433 | 51433 |
| R ² | 0.458 | 0.460 | 0.460 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.395 | 0.397 | 0.397 |

** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$

Table 3: OLS models of respondent familiarity with player names (see Figure 2a)

| | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Black protestor * 2018 | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.012* (0.005) | 0.008 (0.007) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Asian respondent | | -0.006 (0.019) | |
| Black protestor * Asian respondent | | 0.014 (0.013) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Black respondent | | -0.005 (0.015) | |
| Black protestor * Black respondent | | 0.036** (0.011) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Hispanic respondent | | -0.006 (0.010) | |
| Black protestor * Hispanic respondent | | 0.013* (0.006) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White high school-educated respondent | | | 0.001 (0.010) |
| Black protestor * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.017* (0.007) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White college-educated respondent | | | 0.005 (0.010) |
| Black protestor * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.020** (0.006) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 | 0.018** (0.004) | 0.013** (0.004) | 0.024** (0.007) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Asian respondent | | 0.007 (0.018) | |
| Black non-protestor * Asian respondent | | 0.022 (0.012) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Black respondent | | 0.018 (0.014) | |
| Black non-protestor * Black respondent | | 0.027** (0.010) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Hispanic respondent | | 0.007 (0.010) | |
| Black non-protestor * Hispanic respondent | | 0.027** (0.006) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.022* (0.009) |
| Black non-protestor * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.020** (0.006) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.005 (0.009) |
| Black non-protestor * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.029** (0.005) |
| Player fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Respondent fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 259849 | 259849 | 259849 |
| R ² | 0.222 | 0.222 | 0.222 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.203 | 0.203 | 0.203 |

** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$

Figure 3: Estimated changes in relative popularity after treating non-familiarity as a neutral response (see Figure 2b)

| | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Black protestor * 2018 | -0.006 (0.008) | -0.016 (0.009) | 0.002 (0.015) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Asian respondent | | -0.006 (0.035) | |
| Black protestor * Asian respondent | | 0.082** (0.023) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Black respondent | | 0.019 (0.032) | |
| Black protestor * Black respondent | | 0.110** (0.022) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Hispanic respondent | | 0.016 (0.021) | |
| Black protestor * Hispanic respondent | | 0.052** (0.013) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.054** (0.021) |
| Black protestor * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.037** (0.014) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.003 (0.019) |
| Black protestor * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.045** (0.012) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 | 0.012 (0.007) | 0.003 (0.008) | 0.018 (0.014) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Asian respondent | | -0.014 (0.034) | |
| Black non-protestor * Asian respondent | | 0.080** (0.022) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Black respondent | | 0.021 (0.029) | |
| Black non-protestor * Black respondent | | 0.080** (0.020) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Hispanic respondent | | 0.016 (0.020) | |
| Black non-protestor * Hispanic respondent | | 0.072** (0.012) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.056** (0.019) |
| Black non-protestor * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.085** (0.012) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White college-educated respondent | | | 0.007 (0.018) |
| Black non-protestor * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.087** (0.011) |
| Player fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Respondent fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 259849 | 259849 | 259849 |
| R ² | 0.182 | 0.183 | 0.183 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.162 | 0.163 | 0.163 |

** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$

Figure 4: Changes in popularity of black NFL stars relative to white NFL stars among subgroups of white, non-Hispanic respondents




Table 4: Player popularity in white subgroups: Age and income (see Figure 4)

| | Model 10 | Model 11 |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| Black non-protestor * 2018 | 0.009 (0.015) | 0.009 (0.015) |
| Black protestor * 2018 | -0.008 (0.014) | -0.008 (0.014) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White age 18-34 respondent | -0.008 (0.023) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White age 35-49 respondent | -0.000 (0.019) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White age 50-64 respondent | -0.011 (0.020) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White age 18-34 respondent | -0.037 (0.025) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White age 35-49 respondent | -0.036 (0.021) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White age 50-64 respondent | -0.059** (0.022) | |
| Black non-protestor * White age 18-34 respondent | -0.056** (0.015) | |
| Black non-protestor * White age 35-49 respondent | -0.079** (0.013) | |
| Black non-protestor * White age 50-64 respondent | -0.048** (0.013) | |
| Black protestor * White age 18-34 respondent | -0.042* (0.016) | |
| Black protestor * White age 35-49 respondent | -0.059** (0.014) | |
| Black protestor * White age 50-64 respondent | -0.044** (0.014) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White high income respondent | | -0.005 (0.019) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White low income respondent | | 0.008 (0.019) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White high income respondent | | -0.039 (0.021) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White low income respondent | | -0.041* (0.020) |
| Black non-protestor * White high income respondent | | -0.068** (0.012) |
| Black non-protestor * White low income respondent | | -0.056** (0.012) |
| Black protestor * White high income respondent | | -0.062** (0.013) |
| Black protestor * White low income respondent | | -0.037** (0.013) |
| Player fixed effects? | Yes | Yes |
| Respondent fixed effects? | Yes | Yes |
| N | 51433 | 51433 |
| R ² | 0.460 | 0.460 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.397 | 0.397 |

** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$

Table 5: Player popularity in white subgroups: Age by education (see Figure 4)

| | Model 12 |
|--|---------------------|
| Black protestor * 2018 | 0.009 (0.015) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 | -0.007 (0.014) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White, 18-34, college-educated respondent | 0.011 (0.026) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White, 18-34, high school-educated respondent | -0.050 (0.038) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White, 35-49, college-educated respondent | 0.008 (0.021) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White, 35-49, high school-educated respondent | -0.025 (0.028) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White, 50-64, college-educated respondent | -0.018 (0.029) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White, 50-64, high school-educated respondent | -0.024 (0.027) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White, 18-34, college-educated respondent | -0.014 (0.028) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White, 18-34, high school-educated respondent | -0.096* (0.041) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White, 35-49, college-educated respondent | -0.029 (0.023) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White, 35-49, high school-educated respondent | -0.058 (0.030) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White, 50-64, college-educated respondent | -0.081* (0.031) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White, 50-64, high school-educated respondent | -0.104** (0.028) |
| Black non-protestor * White, 18-34, college-educated respondent | -0.060** (0.017) |
| Black non-protestor * White, 18-34, high school-educated respondent | -0.044 (0.027) |
| Black non-protestor * White, 35-49, college-educated respondent | -0.056** (0.014) |
| Black non-protestor * White, 35-49, high school-educated respondent | -0.022 (0.021) |
| Black non-protestor * White, 50-64, college-educated respondent | -0.084** (0.014) |
| Black non-protestor * White, 50-64, high school-educated respondent | -0.062** (0.021) |
| Black protestor * White, 18-34, college-educated respondent | -0.052** (0.018) |
| Black protestor * White, 18-34, high school-educated respondent | -0.009 (0.029) |
| Black protestor * White, 35-49, college-educated respondent | -0.052** (0.015) |
| Black protestor * White, 35-49, high school-educated respondent | -0.022 (0.022) |
| Black protestor * White, 50-64, college-educated respondent | -0.074** (0.015) |
| Black protestor * White, 50-64, high school-educated respondent | -0.000 (0.021) |
| Player fixed effects? | Yes |
| Respondent fixed effects? | Yes |
| N | 51433 |
| R ² | 0.460 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.397 |

** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$

Table 6: Player popularity in white subgroups: Income by education (see Figure 4)

| | Model 13 |
|---|---------------------|
| Black non-protestor * 2018 | -0.008 (0.014) |
| Black protestor * 2018 | 0.009 (0.015) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White college-educated, high income respondent | 0.008 (0.020) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White college-educated, low income respondent | 0.030 (0.024) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White HS-educated, high income respondent | -0.056 (0.031) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White HS-educated, low income respondent | -0.015 (0.023) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White college-educated, high income respondent | -0.031 (0.022) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White college-educated, low income respondent | -0.011 (0.026) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White HS-educated, high income respondent | -0.083* (0.033) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White HS-educated, low income respondent | -0.079** (0.024) |
| Black non-protestor * White college-educated, high income respondent | -0.068** (0.014) |
| Black non-protestor * White college-educated, low income respondent | -0.051** (0.015) |
| Black non-protestor * White HS-educated, high income respondent | -0.024 (0.024) |
| Black non-protestor * White HS-educated, low income respondent | -0.007 (0.018) |
| Black protestor * White college-educated, high income respondent | -0.072** (0.013) |
| Black protestor * White college-educated, low income respondent | -0.064** (0.014) |
| Black protestor * White HS-educated, high income respondent | -0.043 (0.023) |
| Black protestor * White HS-educated, low income respondent | -0.040* (0.017) |
| Player fixed effects? | Yes |
| Respondent fixed effects? | Yes |
| N | 51433 |
| R ² | 0.460 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.397 |

** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$

Figure 5: Estimated changes in black and white NFLers' popularity incorporating team fixed effects and end-of-season awards




Table 7: Player popularity incorporating team fixed effects and end-of-season awards (see Figure 5)

| | Model 14 | Model 15 | Model 16 |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Black non-protestor * 2018 | -0.0177 (0.0106) | -0.0215 (0.0115) | -0.0207 (0.0159) |
| Black protestor * 2018 | 0.0119 (0.0127) | -0.0002 (0.0136) | 0.0383* (0.0182) |
| Award | 0.0002 (0.0059) | -0.0001 (0.0059) | -0.0002 (0.0059) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Hispanic respondent | | 0.0244 (0.0231) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Black respondent | | -0.0132 (0.0215) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * Asian respondent | | -0.0992* (0.0485) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Hispanic respondent | | 0.0481 (0.0265) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Black respondent | | 0.0352 (0.0228) | |
| Black protestor * 2018 * Asian respondent | | 0.0072 (0.0450) | |
| Black non-protestor * Hispanic respondent | | 0.0411** (0.0145) | |
| Black non-protestor * Black respondent | | 0.0838** (0.0157) | |
| Black non-protestor * Asian respondent | | 0.0599* (0.0258) | |
| Black protestor * Hispanic respondent | | 0.0258 (0.0160) | |
| Black protestor * Black respondent | | 0.0701** (0.0159) | |
| Black protestor * Asian respondent | | 0.0740** (0.0271) | |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White college-educated respondent | | | 0.0112 (0.0178) |
| Black non-protestor * 2018 * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.0286 (0.0206) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.0253 (0.0197) |
| Black protestor * 2018 * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.0786** (0.0220) |
| Black non-protestor * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.0664** (0.0113) |
| Black non-protestor * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.0616** (0.0121) |
| Black protestor * White college-educated respondent | | | -0.0394** (0.0152) |
| Black protestor * White high school-educated respondent | | | -0.0123 (0.0158) |
| Player fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Respondent fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| N | 51433 | 51433 | 51433 |
| R ² | 0.4618 | 0.4630 | 0.4630 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.3989 | 0.4001 | 0.4002 |

** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$